CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE:
The Law and Norms of Attribution
Catherine L. Fisk*
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.**

Introduction
Attribution is foundational to the modern economy. The reputation we
develop for the work we do proves to the world the nature of our human
capital. Credit is instrumentally beneficial in establishing a reputation, and
intrinsically valuable simply for the pleasure of being acknowledged. Indeed,
credit is itself a form of human capital. If professional reputation were
property, it would be the most valuable property that most people own. In
Hollywood, screen credit is wonderful on a blockbuster and terrible on a flop.
In academia, being an author or inventor is often more valuable than owning
the copyright or patent. In high velocity labor markets,1 attributions of
creativity and competence are the core of references or resumes. Credit
matters in an information economy because it is difficult to measure worker
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knowledge directly in the way that the ability of typists and machinists can be
tested simply by watching them perform a task.
Attribution plays important functions in addition to its role in human
capital. First, it is one of the principal psychic and economic rewards of
innovation. The twentieth-century corporation transformed the reward
function of attribution in a manner that law in the twenty-first century
knowledge economy must address. Corporate intellectual property and
corporate employment were initially regarded as a threat to innovation and,
therefore, to entrepreneurship, but firms avoided malaise by devising
attribution schemes to reward and promote innovation. Second, attribution
serves a trademark function: the same novel would sell better with John
Grisham’s name on the cover rather than mine, and a scientific study produced
by a respected university scientist is more likely to be considered reliable than
one conducted by pharmaceutical company employees. Moreover, attribution
marks the divide between news and propaganda, as suggested by the furor over
U.S. efforts to place American government-produced reports on the occupation
of Iraq in Iraqi and U.S. news media as if they were written by Iraqi or U.S.
news media employees.2 Attribution even serves a legitimating function: when
Hollywood studios became concerned about unauthorized duplication of
DVDs, they created a series of short ads featuring technical workers explaining
how piracy affects their livelihood by hurting sales of major motion pictures.
Deploying the emotion of a set builder in a flannel shirt – a guy who in no
circumstances will ever have a claim to intellectual property rights in a film –
is a persuasive rhetorical strategy because it links the sanctity of corporate
copyrights to the paychecks of real people.
Although attribution is ubiquitous and important, it is largely
unregulated by law. Intellectual property law does not because corporations
own IP and there is no American equivalent of the moral right of attribution.3
Nor has employment law filled the gap. In the absence of law, economic
sectors that value attribution have devised non-property regimes founded on
social norms to acknowledge and reward employee effort and to attribute
responsibility for the success or failure of products and projects. Whether it is
screen credit, scientific authorship, or the employee of the month, norms play
at least as large a role as legal rules in mediating among different possible
candidates for praise or blame. Attribution is one of many areas of the work
2
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relationship in which norms dwarf the significance of law in the creation and
enforcement of rights.4 To understand attribution – a topic of central
importance both to employment law and to intellectual property – we must
understand the norms governing it.
Attribution has recently gained scholarly attention in law, the sciences,
and the humanities. Intellectual property scholars have explored the trademark
aspects of author designations to advocate trademark or copyright protection.5
Others examine the complex meanings of scientific authorship attribution
reform in academic publishing.6 And, of course, literary scholars have long
contemplated the significance of author attributions. My purpose is broader.
Through a conceptual merger of intellectual property and employment law, this
article studies how credit and blame are allocated in many sectors of society
that tend to be below the radar of intellectual property law. Regardless of who
owns patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, or other workplace
knowledge, workplace rules and norms regulate why some contributors are
credited as creators, some only acknowledged for assistance, and some not
noted at all.
Working from assessment of how attribution systems operate, I offer a
theory of how such systems should operate and why greater legal recognition
of attribution rights is desirable. The right I propose would be neither a
property right in the intellectual property sense nor a liability rule in the tort
sense (unlike, for example, the torts of publicity or defamation), both of which
give a qualified right to prevent sale or dissemination of a work without proper
attribution. Rather, I argue for greater attention to attribution rights within the
existing legal regime of employment contracts. The proposal is a specific
4

See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458
(2001).
5
Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and
Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263 (2004); Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay – The
Author’s Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of
Paternity? Columbia Law School Pub. Law & Leg. Theory Working Paper No. 0591, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=724343; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright
and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2002); Greg Lastowka, The Trademark
Function of Authorship, 85 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1171 (2005); Laura A. Heymann, The
Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005).
6
See infra at notes 80 - 86.
3/24/2006

4

CATHERINE L. FISK

instantiation of the legal theory of reflexive law: an effort to regulate behavior
with the goal of protection by the shaping of norms and through self-regulatory
structures.7 My goal is to make all aspects of attribution more efficient and fair
without encroaching unduly on the free circulation of ideas or undermining the
flexibility of existing norms-based approaches to attribution. Because
innovation is spurred by information spillovers linked to employee mobility;
people should have attribution rights to enable that mobility without restricting
the use of the information that enables innovation. In short, legal rights to
knowledge must be bifurcated into exclusivity rights (traditional IP rights to
control the knowledge) and attribution rights (rights to control reputation).
Part I demonstrates the importance of attribution, with particular
attention to its historic development. Part II posits six desirable characteristics
of any attribution regime, describes the variety of formal and informal
attribution systems in various industries, and explores how the current mix of
legal rules and social norms measure up to the six ideal characteristics. Part III
explains, based on evidence and economic theory, why extant contract-based
and norms-based attribution regimes fail optimally to protect attribution
interests. Part IV proposes a new approach to employment contracts designed
to shore up the desirable characteristics of existing norms-based attribution
systems while allowing legal intervention only in the circumstances of market
failure. I propose that a right of attribution, whose existence would be
determined by workplace or industry norms, be regarded as a legally
enforceable implied term of every employment contract. The right to public
attribution would be waivable upon proof of a procedurally fair negotiation.
The right to attribution necessary to build human capital, however, would be
inalienable. Thus, while The Economist would remain free to insist that its
writers use no bylines, it would be contractually obligated fairly to attribute
articles in its own internal employee assessments and in the context of
recommending writers for jobs at other organizations. A breach of the implied
agreement would not, unlike moral rights, entitle the employee to block access
to the work itself; the only remedy would be for the lost value of human
capital. As explained in the conclusion, the variation in attribution norms that
currently exists among economic sectors and different workplace cultures can
and should be preserved through the contract approach I suggest. My proposal
7
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also strikes an appropriate balance between expansive and narrow legal
protections for workplace knowledge and, in that respect, addresses one of the
most vexing current debates at the intersection of intellectual property and
employment law.
I.

Attribution Matters

The most important but least studied function of attribution is its role
in creating and signaling human capital. In an information economy, especially
one characterized by high degrees of labor turnover, human capital is
fantastically important to employees and to firms.8 Particularly in the case of
highly-educated or highly-skilled employees or people who possess a great
deal of tacit knowledge, assessing the nature and value of human capital is
difficult.9 The abilities of a software designer or music producer cannot be
measured the way the speed of a typist or the competence of a machine
operator can. When the cost of errors in assessment is great, or when
assessments about human capital need to be made frequently or rapidly, easily
interpreted information about human capital is valuable because it reduces
search costs. Thus credit becomes a form of human capital itself because it
translates and signals the existence of a deeper layer of human capital.
Attribution has a commodity value distinct from the value of the
intellectual property or human capital to which it is attached. The commodity
value of credit is entirely informational: it tells consumers, current and
8
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prospective employers, creators, and the world at large about products and their
creators. The commodity value of credit is dissipated if the right to it is
transferred because the information is lost. Attribution is a form of signal and
it operates in labor and other markets plagued by information asymmetries in
which reliable signals are important.
For nearly a century, American intellectual property law tended to
assume that intellectual property and attribution rights did and should
substantially overlap. Intellectual property rights – patents, copyrights, and, to
some extent, trademarks -- were thought to be a principal method by which law
acknowledged creativity. Of course, since intellectual property rights have
long been assignable and there is nothing new in the recognition that major
contributors to projects are not always joint authors or joint inventors, there
was never a complete equivalence between IP ownership and attribution.
Nevertheless, today more than ever, intellectual property is divorced from
creators. To most employees most of the time, what matters is not that you own
your patent or copyright, but that you can truthfully claim to be the inventor or
author of it.
The divorce of intellectual property from credit was slow in coming,
precisely because the credit function of authorship and invention was so firmly
entrenched in thinking about the purposes of intellectual property. Even as
nineteenth-century American courts were digesting the idea that invention and
authorship were rarely the solitary activity of single individuals, but were likely
to occur in workplaces and to be funded by firms, judges still insisted upon
employee ownership of intellectual property rights because of the power of the
moral claims to credit for creativity. Meanwhile, Germany and France reacted
to the rise of corporate creation by developing moral rights explicitly to protect
both a right of attribution and a right of integrity.10 By the early twentieth
century, American courts accepted the corporate control of intellectual property
and abandoned the view that intellectual property rights had to be tied to actual
inventor and authors.
Yet it remains important to attribute authorship of ideas, texts, and
technologies, to actual persons, even if the attribution does not affect
intellectual property rights. Not surprisingly, almost every group that creates
10
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anything adopts a process for attributing responsibility. Paradoxically, in the
modern information economy where we have moved away from personal
rights to intellectual property in favor of corporate rights, we increasingly value
attribution because labor mobility and the decline of personal relationships
have limited access to other sources of information about employees.
As explained below, attribution serves four principal functions.
Attribution is, first, is a reward and an incentive for future creativity. Second, it
is a form of discipline that punishes unacceptable work. Third, attribution
enables consumers to assess quality and sellers to create a brand. Finally,
attribution serves a humanizing function, linking the products of work to the
reality of human endeavor. Each of these functions requires that the right to
attribution be inalienable, at least in some contexts, so that the people who are
credited or blamed for a work are in fact the ones behind it. Attribution matters
differently in different contexts, however. The functions of attribution can still
be served in some contexts when it is alienable vis a vis the public, but it can
never be alienable as a measure of human capital.11 Within every organization
attributions are made for purposes of pay, promotion, or blame, for those
purposes attribution must be inalienable.
A.

The Reward Function

People throughout recorded history have valued the reputations they
gain by associating their names with their work. Even when the author,
inventor, discoverer, or artisan made little or no money from the work itself, it
has long been an honor to be credited with good work. Great artists of all
kinds have destroyed work that they thought did not measure up to their
standards, even when they might have profited more (at least in the short term)
from selling their lesser works rather than destroying them. American
intellectual property law – which, as is well known, was intended to be an
instrument to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts” by
according copyrights and patents to authors and inventors – was premised on
the idea that people will have a greater incentive to create if creators enjoy not
merely the income stream from sales of the intellectual property itself but also
the economic and psychic benefits of the reputation gained by being the
creator.12
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Nineteenth-century courts believed that actual attributions of
authorship were an important reward above and beyond the economic value of
the intellectual property rights themselves. Courts did not conclude that
employers were the owners of patented inventions or copyrighted works of
authorship until the turn of the twentieth century.13 Nineteenth-century courts
were aware that equating IP ownership with attribution had both intrinsic and
instrumental motivations: intrinsically it acknowledged the moral value of
creativity, and instrumentally it encouraged creativity by linking the honors of
creativity to the actual inventor rather than to the firm. Thus, for example,
American patent law has always required the true and original inventor to be
identified in the patent application,14 even though patents are routinely issued
to entities other than the inventor based on a pre-invention assignment
agreement. Patent law confers an inalienable right to attribution because
Congress and courts believed that attribution was a valuable reward for
inventors even when the patent itself was assigned. Whose work is sufficient
to “count” him or her as an inventor for purposes of the legally-mandated
attribution is governed by a complex web of social norms regarding invention
and the purposes of patenting.15 In time past, social norms suggested that
patents could not or should not be sought by artisans as opposed to scientists
because they were not deemed worthy of the honor, as has been shown by
work on early nineteenth century German optics.16 Who can and should be
credited with invention is thus culturally specific and wrapped up as much in
norms about honor and credit as in the supposedly simple fact of who
conceived a new idea.
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Scholars and judges of the early twentieth century feared that
corporate intellectual property would undermine the reward function of
attribution. The fear was part of a more general concern that large firms
threatened entrepreneurship because creative and potentially entrepreneurial
people might believe that their own work and risk-taking would not be noticed
or rewarded. For example, Joseph Schumpeter hypothesized in his 1911 book,
The Theory of Economic Development, that economic development is driven,
in part, by innovation and entrepreneurship, and the entrepreneur is in turn
driven by “the joy of creating” and “the will to conquer.”17 Schumpeter
believed that “[i]n the modern corporation, entrepreneurial gains are as a rule
merged with many other elements into the profit item, and the individuals who
fill the entrepreneurial function are separated from them – accepting the
salaries and other prerequisites of executives in lieu of them.”18 Schumpeter
worried that bureaucratization and automation of the entrepreneurial process
would undermine the “will to conquer” and lead to a decline in
entrepreneurship.19 The twentieth century challenge, as Schumpeter correctly
diagnosed, was to preserve the entrepreneurial spirit within the harness of
bureaucratic work. Attribution was crucial in that endeavor. At the same time,
the rise of bureaucratic human resources management in the twentieth century
placed a premium on attributing good and poor work for purposes of
promotion on the hierarchical job ladders that characterized the large midtwentieth century corporation.20 The creation of meaningful attribution systems
thus became the strategy by which bureaucratic firms attempted to avoid the
destruction of entrepreneurial capitalism that Schumpeter predicted when he
suggested that capitalism would be undermined by its own success in building
large bureaucratic corporations.21
Twentieth century firms developed attribution systems by creating
internal reward programs for encouraging employees to develop ideas.
Inventions were typically rewarded both with some monetary bonus and with
17
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the implicit promise to recognize the idea as the employee’s and to celebrate
the individual’s creative achievement within the firm. An early example of
such a system was the one developed at Kodak. Kodak was a firm whose
business model was built on rapid innovation and the aggressive use of patents
and trade secrets.22 In addition, Kodak early recognized the importance of
trademarks and marketing and thus knew the benefits of associating a name
with an idea. A company acutely aware of the value of intellectual property
and that aggressively asserted its claims to intellectual property vis a vis its
employees had to come up with a system for motivating workers who could
not claim intellectual property rights. Starting in 1913 and continuing through
much of the twentieth century, the company paid its front-line employees for
useful suggestions in the areas of “Cost Reduction, Accident Prevention,
Improvement of Product, and General Maintenance.”23 It published lists of
such suggestions and the dollar amounts awarded, which were sometimes
nominal but sometimes significant.24 Kodak publications for employees
pushed the suggestion system, urging employees not to be shy about
submitting their ideas.25 Articles in those publications featured employees who
had received unusually large awards for their suggestions.26
Kodak’s was typical of the attribution systems at many large
twentieth-century technology companies. Du Pont, like Kodak, aggressively
22
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26
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claimed intellectual property rights to all employee innovations. Like
Kodak, it had an elaborate research and development program and developed
a bonus program to motivate salaried employees to invent without the
prospect of financial gain from the intellectual property they might develop.
At Du Pont as elsewhere, employees were critical of the reward system; it was
too easy and too common, a Du Pont employee complained, for superiors in
the lab to take credit for the work done by subordinates. While some
complained about the modest dollar value of the bonuses, others seemed more
concerned about the vagaries in who was credited. Reputation loomed as large
as money, and the lost opportunity to be entrepreneurial about one’s reputation
loomed as large as any.27
As these examples suggest, when corporations secured control of
employees and their intellectual property, managers devised alternatives to
intellectual property ownership to provide financial and psychic rewards
deemed necessary to encourage innovation. Notwithstanding the widespread
recognition of the importance of such processes, they operated (and continue to
operate) almost entirely outside the scope of legal regulation. Firms even
resisted characterizing the bonus programs as contracts for fear of losing
discretionary control over credit determinations, although they encouraged
employees to believe that the systems were fair and consistent. Inasmuch as
mid-twentieth century employment law generally gave firms substantial
leeway to revise employment terms at will, the informality of attribution
systems was not out of the mainstream of employment practices.
Even today, it is widely recognized that the reward function of
attribution underpins the system of corporate ownership of workplace
knowledge. The economic critique of employee ownership of workplace
intellectual property rests on the contention that individuals do not need the
incentive of intellectual property ownership because lucrative employment
provide sufficient incentive.28 Thus, the argument goes, the reward function of
intellectual property ownership is most efficiently allocated to the firm. The
analysis rests on the assumption that the inventive employee will at least be
credited with the invention so that his employment will be lucrative in
proportion to his creativity and, thus, the incentive to invent will remain.
27
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B.

The Discipline Function

Author attribution as a form of discipline is a concept that is quite
familiar to literary scholars, though perhaps less so to legal scholars.
Copyright prior to the first English Copyright Act, the 1710 Statute of Anne,
was almost entirely about disciplining rather than rewarding authors; copyright
was a system of printing privileges that enabled censorship. Early copyright
regulation named the author so that appropriate authorities could institute
prosecutions for heresy, sedition, or libel.29 Attribution mattered because
religious authorities were not satisfied to punish only the publisher of heresy
and to spare the heretic himself. Once copyright became property, the
disciplinary function of authorship also encompassed defining and policing
plagiarism, libel, and copyright infringement.30
The disciplinary function of associating a person with an idea exists
outside the realm of copyright and literary works too. Historically, scientific
claims were linked to authors to police heresy; today they are linked to authors
to police fraud.31 Attributing information is considered an important deterrent
to gossip and rumor mongering. Of course, attribution is not always a servant
of truth: protecting the anonymity of sources, and especially of leaks, is often
thought to be the best guarantor of truth. The recent efforts of the government
to identify who leaked the information about the covert program of government
surveillance of U.S. citizens, one might argue, is designed as much to deter the
revelation of truthful information as to prevent the spread of false
information.32 All, of course, are forms of discipline.
There is a long tradition, extending back to craft guilds of the premodern period, of craftsmen placing their seal on work as an assurance of
quality.33 Such a system has obviously positive and negative reputational
effects, depending on the quality of the product. Today, of course, many
professional licensing regimes (including in law, medicine, and engineering)
29
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require that the professional certify the quality of work, and discipline is
imposed on the person who certifies that the work is satisfactory if the work
either falls below some standard or if the seal is placed wrongfully.34 In
academia, credit and responsibility remain clearly tied to the name of the
scholar, not the copyright owner, and responsibility for the truth of claims falls
on the natural person whose name is listed as author because the name is the
link between the person and the claim.35 And in the world of print journalism,
which tries to walk the fine and shifting line between corporate promotion of
information products and the objective and reliable reporting of truth, the
identification of by-lines and contributing reporters is a deliberate effort to
deter fraud and to focus blame when problems happen anyway. In this
perspective, the name recognition of Judith Miller or Jayson Blair saves the
brand of The New York Times; the fault for journalistic scandals can be
attributed to individuals rather than to the paper as a whole.36
C.

The Branding Function

Within legal scholarship recently, and within literary scholarship for
generations, many have explored the significance of attribution in shaping
perceptions of copyrighted works.37 The phenomenon of how attribution of
creation creates a sort of brand or a trademark that attaches both to the object
and to the putative creator is less thoroughly studied when the works in
question are other than literary texts, but it is as old if not older than the
phenomenon of literary authorship.38
For as long as creator attributions have been made the question has
arisen whether the attributions must be accurate, in the sense of referring to a
particular person by a name that was traceable to that person. To some extent,
it was accepted that the right of attribution had to be inalienable in order for the
branding function to retain its value. Consumers of both scientific information
and novels would be justifiably disappointed if the name of the putative author
was no longer a reliable indication of veracity or quality. Of course there may
be circumstances in which attribution to a fictive person is a mark of the
34

Attribution within the context of professional certification is discussed infra at
II.C.5.
35
Mario Biagioli, Documents of Documents, supra note 31 at 14.
36
Attribution issues in print journalism, particularly with respect to scandals such as
that involving Jayson Blair, are discussed infra at II.C.3.
37
See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 5.
38
The original “trade mark,” the mark that an artisan was required by the guild to
attach to any product made, dates in Europe to a pre-Renaissance period well before the
phenomenon of literary authorship. See id at 1413.
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quality; readers of Nancy Drew novels expect them to be authored by “Carolyn
Keene” even though she does not exist and the books were written by a number
of different people according to specifications established by the publisher.
Whereas the credibility of scientific fact was in part tied to the author’s
name, the author needed in some contexts to avoid being too overtly pushy in
publishing his work, lest his work lose credibility that way. Steven Shapin
remarked that “a disengaged and nonproprietary presentation of authorial self,”
enhanced credibility by removing the possibility that the scientist had a
mercenary interest in publishing his work. As Roger Chartier also observed,
“The trope of reluctant authorship and resistance to printed publication was
very common in early modern culture, but it acquired particular meaning with
scientific texts: it assured their credibility since it proved that there was no
economic interest attached to the published knowledge claims.” 39
As modern marketing developed, the use of author attributions to
vouch for the quality of a product became standard. Rand-McNally, which was
quite aggressive in claiming all patents and copyrights to all of its maps and
globes, nevertheless used the names and photographs of its leading
cartographers in its advertising to convince the public of the quality of its
products. The J. Paul Goode atlas and globe, and even the particular methods
he used for portraying the round earth on a flat map with minimal distortion,
were attributed to him and his academic credentials (he was a professor at the
University of Chicago), were featured prominently in their brochures.40
Whereas centuries before, the name of Gerhardus Mercator was linked to his
projection in the way that Euclid’s theorem or Copernicus’ theory or Galileo’s
was, by the early twentieth century the name of the geographer became an
advertising device more than a celebration of the contributions of the creator.41
The use of a personal name as a trademark presents ambiguities when the
39

STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH: CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1994); Roger Chartier, Foucault’s Chiasmus:
Authorship Between Science and Literature in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries, in SCIENTIFIC AUTHORSHIP supra note 16.
40
The Rand McNally company records are in the Newberry Library in Chicago as
part of the John M. Wing Foundation on the History of Printing. The Goode
documents are in Rand McNally Series 3, Box 7, Folders 69 and 75. I discuss Rand
McNally’s approach to attribution and employee intellectual property in detail in
Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Employee Innovation and the Rise of
Corporate Intellectual Property (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
41
MARK MONMONIER, RHUMB LINES AND MAP WARS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
MERCATOR PROJECTION (2004).
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person and the company that bears her name have a parting of the ways, as
happened recently to the English fashion designer Elizabeth Emanuel, who
originally made her reputation designing Princess Diana’s wedding dress.
Should the business to whom the name was assigned as a trademark own the
right to use of the name, forcing the person to do business under some name
other than her own, and perhaps prompting customer confusion as to whether
the person remains involved with the company? Or is the departure of the
person from the firm grounds to revoke the assignment because it is misleading
to suggest the continuing involvement of person with the firm via the name?42
The branding aspects of attribution raise other ambiguities about how
to allocate responsibility for work. When some executives of Coca Cola
attempted, beginning with enormous fanfare and ending in spectacular failure,
to change the flavor of the signature cola drink about twenty years ago, most of
the flak fell on the company, not on the chemists who developed the new flavor
or the executives or marketing people who thought it was a good idea. And
when the innovation fell flat, the Coca Cola brand had to be resuscitated as
well as -- or even more than -- the reputations of the responsible employees.
One hundred years ago, a spectacular failure of technological innovation would
have harmed the reputation of the inventor as much or more than the company
that bore his name. Disaggregating corporate and individual attribution is
difficult.
Attribution enables the economy of authority and influence to operate,
as Andy Warhol’s famous quip (“In the future everybody will be world famous
for fifteen minutes”) suggests.43 Attribution is thus akin to celebrity.
Intellectuals are not immune to this: universities seem unable to resist the
temptation to count citations as a measure of academic accomplishment, even
as they decry the practice because citation counts reward a controversial
position on a salient or trendy topic more than a thoughtful analysis of an
important but unstudied one. The work a renowned scholar is appealing to
journals that want to enhance their own reputation by publishing important
work. It is a positive feedback loop: the journal’s reputation is enhanced by
42

Elizabeth Florence Emanuel v. Continental Shelf 128 Ltd., Opinion of Advocate
General, Case C-259/04, a preliminary ruling for the High Court of Justice of
England and Wales, by the person appointed by the Lord Chancellor under section 7b
of the Trade Marks Act of 1984, available at http://curia.edu.int/jurisp (last visited
Jan. 31, 2006) (departure of Emanuel from the firm that bears her name is not
grounds for revocation of the assignment of the trademark).
43
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 803 (Elizabeth Knowles, ed., 5th ed.)
(attributes quote to a volume released to mark Warhol’s exhibition in Stockholm,
February – March, 1968).
3/24/2006

16

CATHERINE L. FISK

publishing the work of a renowned scholar, and the scholar’s reputation grows
by publishing in a preeminent journal.
D.

The Humanizing Function

The late twentieth-century erasure of the name of natural person from
the responsibility for the innovation has dehumanized intellectual property and
the ideas and work embodied or reflected in it. The severing of the link
between people and ideas does not always serve the interests of the
corporations that own the intellectual property. Today’s huge anti-piracy
campaign illustrates the risks. People on peer-to-peer file-sharing networks
feel less guilt about unauthorized copying of copyrighted music or DVDs than
they might feel about shoplifting. The dire “FBI Warnings” that precede every
DVD or videocassette you’ve ever watched are just so much noise. To crack
down on unauthorized duplication, the copyright owners had to marshal actual
(and preferably not too wealthy) musicians and performers to make the case
that copyright infringement is stealing. In a world of corporate production, and
in particular skepticism about corporate production, author attributions serve a
humanizing function. Dave the set painter who inveighs against piracy by
lamenting its impact on working class Hollywood does just that.44
Attribution humanizes bureaucratic work processes and legitimates
business by humanizing it in the eyes of the public. It translates employee
effort for public view both for the benefit of employees and for the benefit of
the firm. The ubiquitous posters in service workplaces that honor the
“employee of the month” reward and motivate employees by holding them up
for compliments as they simultaneously humanize the firm to customers by
suggesting it’s the kind of place that honors its employees. Executives
everywhere from Wal-Mart to Paramount Pictures are aware that they have to
humanize their work processes in order to shore up the legitimacy of their
property rights.
Yet there are times in which the actual creator must remain anonymous
in order to portray the humanity of someone else. The tradition of keeping
speechwriters well in the background is necessary to preserve the cult of the
personality in contemporary American politics. We participate in a willing
suspension of disbelief when we attribute speeches to the candidate or
politician, and treat the speeches as a window into the heart and mind of the
speaker. At some level we know, or at least we suspect, that some of what he
44

David the set-painter was a real person. See Patrick Goldstein, The Big Picture:
Hollywood Deals With Piracy, A Wary Eye on CDs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at E1.
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says is not what he really thinks, or that the turns of phrase may not reflect his
own personality, but we treat him as if he is speaking his own heart and mind
and projecting his own personality, not giving voice to the carefully considered
position of a committee of advisors and speechwriters. Moreover, there is a
long history to treating pseudonymous writing as suggesting that the author is
especially “authentic.”45 Perhaps in today’s world skepticism about authenticity
is even greater. The desire to link the word to the person – both moving
backward to the “actual” author and forward through the actor to the character
played by the actor -- is especially acute in a world in which the glut of
television, Internet, and digital media blur the boundary between our sense of
reality and the words and images that constantly surround us.
In sum, contemporary attribution is valuable to creators, to their
employers, to consumers of information and of products, and to manufacturers
and sellers of anything. As will be seen, its importance is reflected in the
ubiquity of attribution norms in every imaginable occupation. Its diverse
functions are reflected in the variety of such norms.
II.

The Operation of Contemporary Attribution Processes

Like any landscape painting, the following effort to portray the entire
field of legal and norms-based rights of attribution cannot cover everything or
even do justice to most. I begin with a survey of legal regulation. I then
describe six criteria we should use to evaluate how well any law- or normsbased attribution regime serves the values of attribution that have been
identified so far. Finally, I provide a sample of the array of non-legal
attribution systems that exist. My goal is to identify the major landmarks of
law, normative evaluation, and norms. Of necessity, I can paint only some in
detail, while evoking a sense of the smaller features and omitting others
entirely.
A.

Legal Rights to Attribution

International law articulates a general right to recognition for the fruits
of one’s creativity. Although the right probably emanates from the droit moral,
which in European countries gives authors a right to attribution for their
copyrighted works regardless of copyright ownership, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights recognize the right of
45

Heymann, supra note 5; JENNIE ERDAL, GHOSTING: A DOUBLE LIFE (2004) (a
memoir of years spent working as a ghost writer).
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attribution in general terms, not limited to works that would be eligible for
copyright.46 French and German laws accord moral rights of attribution and
integrity to the author. The moral right of integrity empowers authors to
prevent certain changes to the work, even if the author is not the copyright
owner. The moral right of attribution (sometimes called the right of paternity)
entitles the author to credit. The Berne Convention, to which the United States
is a signatory, also recognizes a right of attribution. Indeed, the right of
attribution is one of the strongest of the Berne rights.47 In the United States,
there may be a widespread agreement on a norm of recognition for creativity,
absent an agreement to waive the recognition, but there is no general legal right
to be credited for one’s work.
The right of attribution protected by trademark law focuses mainly on
the linking of words, designs, numbers, or sounds to goods and services, and
the businesses that sell them. The purpose of a trademark is to identify and
distinguish goods or services as coming from a single source.48 Thus, it
46

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15(1),
G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). The ICESCR recognizes the right to
“benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”
47
Article 6bis, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Paris Act of July 24, 1971, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/index.html. On moral
rights, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible? 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 991, 996 (1990); Henry Hansman & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’
Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95
(1997); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988). Recent
comparisons of American, French, and German approaches to moral rights include
Dana Beldiman, Fundamental Rights, Author’s Right and Copyright –
Commonalities or Divergences? 29 COLUM. J. L & ARTS 39 (2005) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC A L’INFORMATION –
APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE (2004)), and Adolph Dietz, ALAI Congress:
Antwerp 1993, the Moral Rights of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law
Countries, 19 COLUM. –VLA J.L. & ARTS 199 (1995).
48
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (a federal trademark is “a word, name, symbol, or device” used
“to identify and distinguish” goods “from those manufactured or sold by others and
to indicate the source of the goods”; a federal service mark is used to “identify and
distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services
of others and to indicate the source of the services”). See generally ROBERT C.
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functions as a form of attribution. Trademark law explicitly recognizes both
sides of the attribution problem: false attributions can harm the true creator
both by unjustly denying them the positive reputation effects of being
associated with a good product (“passing off”) and by unjustly giving negative
reputation effects of being wrongly associated with a bad product (“reverse
passing off”).49 As will be explained below, all norms-based attribution
regimes attempt to deal with the need to allocate credit and blame in proportion
to contributions to avoid both passing off another’s work as one’s own and
reverse passing off one’s own work as someone else’s.
Until recently, trademark law had been developing a line of cases
creating a right of attribution to published works.50 The Supreme Court put a
stop to it in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation when it
held that there is no right of attribution for screen credit under the Lanham
Act.51 Dastar held that a film whose copyright had expired could be sold
without crediting the original “authors” of the work. The original “authors”
were, of course, not all the original creators of the film, they were owners of
the expired copyright. Intellectual property scholars have generally been
critical of the absence of an attribution right even if not of the result in
Dastar.52

DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS (3d ed. 2002).
49
Indeed, this was part of the reasoning in the Court’s opinion in Dastar for finding
no right of attribution. According to the Court, Dastar would have faced a trademark
suit whether or not it attributed the work. The prior “author,” Twentieth Century Fox
likely would have sued Dastar for reverse passing off (that is, selling the revised
films as being Twentieth Century Fox’s) if Dastar had attributed the films to
Twentieth Century Fox; as it happened, Dastar did not attribute the film and Fox
sued passing off (failing to attribute). Thus, in the Court’s view, the Lanham Act
claim was an effort of Twentieth Century Fox to extend its control over the content
of the programs beyond the expiration of the copyright; it was not really an effort to
protect its reputation as a prior author of the work. 539 U.S. at 36.
50
Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and
Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263 (2004); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright
and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2002).
51
539 U.S. 23 (2003). The relevant provision of the Lanham Act is section 43(a), 15
U.S.C. 1125(a), which prohibits the use of a “false designation of origin” in
connection with the provision of “goods or services.”
52
See Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171
(2005); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as a Trademark: A Perverse
Perspective on the Moral Right of “Paternity,” 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 379
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Generally speaking, United States copyright law does not require the
author of a work to be identified. There are two partial exceptions. First,
under the Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), a limited category of
“recognized” visual artists have a waivable right of attribution for a “work of
visual art,” which essentially includes paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures or
photographs that exist in limited editions of 200 copies or less and are not
works made for hire.53 Second, the multiple authors of joint works (defined by
statute as a “work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parties of a unitary
whole”) are entitled to control the uses of their work and thus are in a position
to insist on attribution.54 Cases and scholarship on joint authorship note the
difficulty of determining when collaborators on a collective work have made
sufficiently significant contributions to be entitled to joint authorship, and
under existing law it is extremely difficult for one collaborator to claim joint
authorship without the express concurrence of other authors.55
The credit function of inventor attribution is well established in patent
law because of the longstanding requirement that a patent, to be valid, must
correctly identify the true and original inventor.56 Scholars of patent law
acknowledge, however, that, notwithstanding a body of law governing who
(2005); Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribution and Plagiarism, 33
AIPLAQJ 1 (2005).
53
17 U.S.C. 106A (defining who are visual artists) 101 (defining works of visual art).
See RayMing Chang, Revisiting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: A Follow Up
Survey on Awareness and Waiver, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. J. 129 (2005) (an empirical
examination of actual practices under VARA).
54
17 U.S.C. 101.
55
See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories”: Narrative’s Implications
for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(2002); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research:
Conflicts on
Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2000); F. Jay
Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Joint Authorship of Motion Pictures, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 225 (2001). Leading cases include Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.2d 195 (2d
Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim of dramaturg that she was joint author of Rent); Childress
v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.2d 1227 (9th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting joint authorship of motion picture); Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130
F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997) (paper written by professor and student was joint work;
relying on correspondence between the two persons and the listing of author names
beginning with student’s).
56
35 U.S.C. § 116-117; 37 C.F.R. §1.45 – 1.48. A patent may be invalidated if the
named inventor “did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.” 35
U.S.C. § 102(f).
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qualifies as a true and original inventor, the attribution of invention is governed
largely by norms. Anecdotal reports suggest that the legal consequences of
false attribution are invoked only when the norms-based system breaks down.
Another partial attribution right is provided by the common law torts
of publicity, false light privacy, and, to some extent, defamation. The right of
publicity protects the interest of celebrities to control the use of their name or
likeness; the tort of invasion of privacy allows anyone to prevent their name or
likeness to be used for commercial purposes or to portray them in a false light;
and the tort of defamation prohibits false and damaging statements about a
person. The right of publicity, like trademark, focuses on names and on
pictures or other representations of a person’s likeness.57 In that sense, it
allows a person to be associated with the persona that her work creates.58 The
law of defamation and false light privacy protect more generally a reputation,
focusing not on the association of the name or likeness with a product but
instead on the attribution of facts to the person. All three of these torts can be
seen to protect, at least in a general sense, the value of a person’s reputation
and the right of people to control what actions or characteristics will be
57

The analogy between the right of publicity and moral rights is developed in
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First
Century, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 151. A recent work urging greater reliance on the
analogy between trademark law and the right of publicity is Stacey L. Dogan & Mark
A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=862965 (November 2005). David Vaver has also remarked
on the conceptual similarity of moral rights the torts of defamation and publicity
under English law. Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 7 INTL J.L. &
INFO. TECH. 270, 271 (2000).
58
Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67
PITT. L. REV. __ (2005). A few cases have upheld false light privacy claims brought
by employees against their employers, though none in the context of a failure to
credit or falsely blaming employee for work quality. Shepards Pharmacy v. Stop &
Shop Co., Inc., 640 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. App. 1994) (employer appropriated
plaintiff’s name and likeness in advertisement announcing purchase of plaintiff’s
business and employment of plaintiff because the advertisement was made before the
purchase and employment agreement were finalized); Negron v. Rexam Cosmetic
Packaging, Inc., 2006 WL 240528 (Conn. Super. 2006) (rejecting false light privacy
claim by employee against employer who posted photos of employee and his dog on
a fishing trip because photos were not publicized outside the workplace); Aranyosi v.
Delchamps, Inc., 739 So.2d 911 (La. App. 1999) (rejecting defamation and false light
privacy claims for lack of evidence of malice); Aker v. New York and Co., Inc., 364
F. Supp. 2d 661 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (allowing defamation claim in context of a public
search of plaintiff’s person outside a retail store).
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attributed to them. But none offers the kind of comprehensive protection for
false attributions that make it difficult for some employees in some contexts to
accurately portray their abilities and accomplishments.59 Moreover, the
significant free speech concerns about these torts suggest that a radical
expansion to generally protect reputation may not be desirable.60
Employment agreements occasionally provide some form of
attribution right, particularly when the agreement calls for the payment of a
bonus upon achieving certain goals. Most states will enforce, through an action
for breach of contract, an express employer promise to pay a bonus to an

59

See, e.g., John Ashby, Note, Employment References: Should Employers Have an
Affirmative Duty to Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring Prospective
Employers? 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 117 (2004) (critically examining the current law on
defamation and failure to disclose problems in the context of references for former
employees); J. Bradley Buckhalter, Speak No Evil: Negligent Employment Referral
and the Employer’s Duty to Warn (or, How Employers Can Have Their Cake and
Eat It Too), 22 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 265 (1998). Notwithstanding the common
perception that employers face possible defamation liability for giving negative
references, a sampling of recent cases rejecting such claims makes clear that it is
quite difficult to overcome the employer’s privilege to make false statements in the
context of job references. Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216 (Cal.
App. 2003) (rejecting claim because mere negligence is not enough to constitute
malice necessary to lose privilege); Kenney v. Gilmore, 393 S.E.2d 472 (Ga. 1990)
(granting employer defendant’s motion for summary judgment finding that
defamatory statements in job reference were privileged); Lawrence v. Syms Corp.,
969 F. Supp. 1014 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (communication of former employee’s past
work performance is privileged); Brunsman v. West Hills Country Club, 785 N.E.2d
794 (Ohio App. 2003)(proof of actual malice to defeat privilege requires clear and
convincing evidence that former employer acting out of spite made defamatory
statements with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth); Young v.
Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Mo. 1990) (employer permissibly revealed private health
information about one employee to allay fears of other employees as to safety of
working conditions); Welch v. Tellabs Operations, Inc., 2003 WL 22970992, 800
N.E.2d 726 (table) (Mass. App. 2003) (unreported) (former employer privileged to
give defamatory job reference because of public interest in providing legal protection
against defamation claims in reference context).
60
See, e.g., F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge?
The
“Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to A Right of
Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1
(2003); Gary Williams, On the QT and Very Hush, Hush: A Proposal to Extend
California’s Right to Privacy to Protect Public Figures from Publication of
Confidential Personal Information, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 337 (1999).
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employee.61 However, courts often find that the entitlement to the bonus lies
within the employer’s sole discretion, and therefore deny employee claims.62
Bonus agreements are among the many areas where courts are unwilling to
treat employment policies as binding contracts. Because employment
agreements tend to be informal, oral, and to change over time, judges tend to
be skeptical about employee assertions about promises to pay bonuses for
outstanding work, just as they are skeptical about promises of job security or
fair disciplinary processes.63
A variation on the express contract theory is the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, which is used when the employer did not breach a contract by
failing to pay a bonus, but instead attempted to avoid the obligation to pay a
bonus earned by firing the employee before the date on which the obligation to
pay the bonus actually accrued. A handful of cases have addressed this
problem by finding breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
which some states recognize as an implied term in employment agreements.
The classic case is Fortune v. National Cash Register Company, in which an atwill salesman was entitled, under the terms of the company bonus agreement,
to be paid a certain bonus for sales made within sales territory assigned to him
61

See, e.g., Ringle v. Bruton, 86 P.3d 1032 (Nev. 2004) (upholding a jury verdict
awarding employee bonus under terms of express agreement); Kelly v. Stamps.Com,
Inc., 2005 WL 3485644 (Cal. App. 2005) (unreported) (allows claim under
California Labor Code that employee entitled to bonus earned under an express
contract).
62
See, e.g., Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais, 2003 WL 22251313 (SDNY 2003)
(collecting cases) (unreported), on reh’g 292 F. Supp. 2d 518 (SDNY 2003); Coats v.
General Motors Corp., 3 Cal. App. 2d 340 (1934).
63
A recent effort to address the poor fit between traditional contract doctrines and the
evolving and informal nature of most employment agreements, see Robert C. Bird,
Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB & EMP. L. 149 (2005). One
complaint about bonus regimes, especially those in law firms or investment banks
where the bonus is a substantial part of the compensation package, is a lack of
transparency about the criteria used to measure performance and how they are
applied in a particular case. In an English case involving a media analyst who sued
for employment discrimination, the employment appeal tribunal was reported to have
said, “No tribunal should be seen to condone a City bonus culture involving secrecy
and/or lack of transparency because of the potentially large amounts involved, as a
reason for avoiding equal pay obligations.” A reform proposed has been for banks
and law firms to be more transparent about the criteria for awarding bonuses, as has
allegedly been done in advertising and media industries, so that employees can both
assess their own performance in light of management’s goals, and management is
clearer in identifying its goals for employees. Lina Saigol, City Braced for Litigation
on Bonuses, FINANCIAL TIMES Feb. 2, 2006 at 2.
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if the territory was assigned to him on the date of the order, a smaller bonus if
the territory was assigned to him at the date of delivery and installation, and a
larger bonus if the territory was assigned to him on both dates.64 A sale was
made into Fortune’s territory and Fortune was fired before the date of delivery.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that if the company fired
Fortune in order to avoid paying him the bonus due on the date of delivery, it
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in Fortune’s
employment agreement, even though, as an at will employee, Fortune could
have been fired for good, bad or no reason.65
The extant cases, like Fortune, take as established that the employee
either was or was not entitled to the bonus. No cases have recognized the
problematic nature of the determination whether the bonus was earned.
Perhaps this is because the only cases litigated are the ones where the bonus
agreement was explicit and where the criteria for determining whether the
employee had earned the bonus were sufficiently clear and objective so as to
make a strong case that the employee had performed up to the standard. Apart
from these cases in which employees have entered into a contract expressly
requiring attribution as part of a bonus program, there is no recognized contract
right to attribution.
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Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
Other cases recognizing availability of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claim to prevent actions that would deprive an employee of an earned bonus include
Magilione v. Aegis Family Health Ctrs, 607 S.E.2d 286 (N.C. App. 2005)
(recognizing claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing when
employer changed bonus calculation method in a manner that prevented employee
from receiving a bonus per an express bonus agreement); Lopresti v. Rutland
Regional Health Servs, Inc., 865 A.2d 1102 (Vt. 2004) (covenant of good faith and
fair dealing would provide claim for accrued bonus benefits but no such claim exists
on the facts, though employee does have claim for termination in violation of public
policy); A. Brod, Inc. v. Worldwide Dreams, LLC, 791 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2004) (unpublished) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be used to
challenge actions short of firing that prevent a party from receiving benefits under
contract, but cannot duplicate claims for breach of contract). Other states do not
recognize the covenant in employment agreements, although in most cases the rejection
of the covenant is a rejection of an effort to use an implied contract theory when the
court has found no express contract to exist. See, e.g., Buist v. Van Haren Elec., Inc.,
2004 WL 2291354 (Mich. App. 2004) (unreported) (rejecting claim for breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in connection with alleged breach of bonus
agreement; court found no express agreement and relies on earlier Michigan
decisions rejecting applicability of covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment context); Barber v. SMH (US), Inc., 509 N.W. 2d 791 (Mich. App.
1993)).
65
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Assessing Attribution Regimes

In this section, I posit and defend criteria that should be used to assess
the operation of an attribution regime. Inasmuch as norms-based attribution
regimes create and define valuable rights, one can assess them in the same in
the same fashion as a public law regime of rights. The vast literature on the
value of fairness and due process in governance, as well as the theoretical and
empirical studies of the benefits of procedural fairness and participatory
governance in the workplace, suggest that some combination of the following
six criteria be used in assessing a workplace attribution regime.66
Transparency. For the same reasons that most legal systems are and
should be relatively transparent -- laws are known and courts are public -- the
credit system should be too. The criteria for granting credit should be
relatively transparent or publicly known. Transparency motivates people to do
the work to earn credit and enables people to conform their conduct so as to
avoid blame. The process by which the criteria will be applied should be
known or at least discoverable by the people to whom the system applies
unless, as explained below, there are good reasons for secrecy.
Third parties may also have an interest in relatively transparent criteria
for allocating credit. To the extent that the economic value of credit is a signal,
the signal will be less effective (and therefore less efficient) if there is
uncertainty about the significance of credit. In other words, the third-party
benefit of credit is informational, and muddiness of the signal undermines the
value.
Participation. Some degree of participation in a governance process is
beneficial both intrinsically and instrumentally. Instrumentally, it is often
likely to produce accuracy as to facts. The people who have the best
information about the abilities and accomplishments of workers are the
66

The value of process generally is discussed in Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and
Improving Legal Processes – A Plea for ‘Process Values’, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1974). The value of fair process in the workplace is explored in PHILIP SELZNICK,
LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Tom R. Tyler & Stephen L. Blader,
The Group Engagement Model:
Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and
Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCOLOGY REV. 349 (2003); E.
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988); TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000).
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workers themselves. Effective unions are thought to contribute to productivity
because they institutionalize a mechanism for information sharing in the
workplace about the creation and use of tacit knowledge as well as safety
issues or cost-saving techniques.67 Participation of workers is likely to protect
legitimacy of the system and the appearance of fairness that are necessary to
employee motivation. Participation has intrinsic value as well. A basic insight
of the literature on democracy generally, and workplace democracy in
particular, is that participation in governance is intrinsically valued, even if it
does not lead to better decisions.68
Equality. The equality value applies in the articulation of criteria for
credit: in the same workplace it seems desirable that if hours worked matters,
they matter equally for all, or if the importance of ideas contributed matters,
they matter equally for all contributors. Equality also applies to the application
of the criteria: if credit is to be given according to effort, it should not be
reserved only for the boss’s current lover. Equality in the criteria and their
application will motivate people; arbitrary granting of credit will often act as a
disincentive to effort. Equality also benefits third parties by enhancing the
clarity of the signal conveyed by the attribution. It helps when reading journal
articles with multiple authors to know that the first author listed is always the
primary researcher, the most senior member of the research team, or the person
whose last name begins with the first letter in the alphabet.
Due Process. Due process refers primarily to the processes used to
resolve disputes regarding attribution. Whereas participation refers primarily
to involvement of people in the quasi-legislative process of determining the
credit criteria, the due process value refers to the involvement of the competing
claimants in the quasi-adjudicative process of resolving disputes about the
application of criteria in a particular case.
The basic elements of due process are notice, a hearing, and a
requirement that an unbiased and competent person make a decision based on
evidence. An appropriate process could address some of the bias problems in
attribution. To do that, the process would need to begin before or at the same
time the creative process begins, at least by putting the participants on notice of
the need to be cognizant of the attribution issues that may arise in their
collaboration. Of course plans for how the parties think they might resolve the
67

See Paul Osterman, The Wage Effects of High Performance Work Organization in
Manufacturing, 59 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 187 (2006); RICHARD FREEMAN &
JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984).
68
As to the value of workplace participation, see RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL
ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999).
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attribution issues might be subject to revision as the process continues and
again when it concludes, once everyone knows who wound up actually doing
which parts of the work. The challenge would be to marry an awareness of the
significance of attribution to the flexibility and generosity that makes ideal
collaboration possible.
Efficiency. All four of the process values identified above –
transparency, participation, equality, and due process – can be expensive to
achieve. Efficiency asks whether the benefits to be gained from improving the
system are worth the costs that will be imposed. The basic idea is that where
credit determinations are enormously valuable and do not happen terribly
frequently (as in the case of screen credit in a major motion picture), it may be
worth investing significant resources in getting it right.
For credit
determinations that happen daily in a firm or frequently in the life of a person,
and where the economic and social benefits of credit (or costs, in the case of
blame) are correspondingly less likely to be large in any particular instance, it
may not make sense for the group to spend substantial resources in getting it
right. Thus, choosing the employee of the week in the local supermarket may
require less process than choosing who is the lead author of a lead article in a
leading academic journal.
Substantive Fairness. Perhaps the most difficult to capture but most
elemental notion of a just attribution system is one that gives credit where it is
due. The substantive fairness value connotes the idea that credit should bear
some relationship to the value of the contribution, whether that is measured in
terms of the number of hours worked or the value of the ideas contributed. It
applies in articulating criteria for how credit should be attributed: it would be
unfair to say that only people born on Tuesday are eligible for screen credit.
The problem is defining when credit is “due.” In some cases, it seems
perfectly acceptable for one’s boss to take credit for the work of subordinates.
When a politician gives a brilliant speech, no one feels it unjust that the
politician does not remind the world that the speechwriter deserves the credit.
When a company scores a major sale, the person in charge of the deal may not
offend anyone’s sensibility by receiving the congratulations of the CEO for
closing the deal. And yet in other contexts, it may be wrong to fail to give
credit. At the celebratory party after the deal is signed, it may indeed be poor
form not to acknowledge the members of the team who worked long hours to
bring it about. If the speechwriter seeks a reference to get another job, it may
be outrageous, or even a breach of an implicit contract, for the politician to
deny that the speechwriter wrote (or worked on) the speech. Context is
everything in determining when credit is due. In addition, norms of substantive
fairness change. As described below, it used to be conventional in advertising
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for the person in charge of an ad campaign to take the credit for it at annual
awards ceremonies; now it appears to be conventional to give credit to a large
number of contributors to the campaign.
C.

Contemporary Attribution Norms and Processes

Bearing those assessment criteria in mind, consider the operation of
attribution schemes in five disparate areas of the economy: Hollywood,
academic and scientific publishing, business, politics, and the professions. I
chose these five areas because collectively they cover a large segment of the
economy and individually they are sufficiently distinct from one another to
give a fair sense of the variety of attribution regimes that exist. Each of these
areas relies primarily on non-legal norms, with a modest degree of legal
backup, to create and administer credit systems. All value accurate attribution
in some contexts, thus suggesting widespread adherence to a norm of
attribution. In the more formal systems, the “right” of attribution operates
much like intellectual property rights; in the less formal systems it seems a
stretch even to call it a norms-based intellectual property system as much as
simply an effort to motivate workers through humane personnel practices or
civil interpersonal relations.
1.

Hollywood

Hollywood (both motion picture and television production) has a
highly formal credit system that is thoroughly infused with legally enforceable
rules. There are elaborate and legally enforceable rules for granting screen
credit. The rules govern whose name will appear and whose will not, and there
are rules governing who can be listed under which job title (director,
screenplay by, key grip, etc.) and the order and size of the print in which names
are listed. The credit rules are the subject of negotiations between the guilds
representing various workers and the production companies, but currently the
administration of credit is left entirely to the guilds representing each of the
forms of talent. One of the most important things that Hollywood guilds do is
to administer the credit system.69
69

See Dougherty, supra note 55; Lastowka, supra note 52; Robert Davenport, Screen
Credit in the Entertainment Industry, 10 Loy. Ent. L.J. 129 (1990); Robert L.
Gordon, Giving the Devil Its Due: Actors’ and Performers’ Right to Receive
Attribution for Cinematic Roles, 4 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 299 (1985); Michael H.
Davis, The Screenwriter’s Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of
Copyright: Once a Story is “Pitched,” A Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in
the Story, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 93 (2000); Stuart K. Kauffman, Motion
Pictures, Moral Rights, and the Incentive Theory of Copyright: The Independent
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Notwithstanding the formality and legally enforceable nature of screen
credit rights, informal norms also play a significant role. Producer credits, one
of the most important on a movie, are not governed by collective bargaining
agreements because the studios do not recognize the Producers Guild as a
union. Therefore, some (including a producer of the 2006 Academy Award
winning movie Crash) complain that producer screen credits are accorded by
the Producers Guild unfairly.70 Because the guild agreements limit the number
of people who can be credited in some roles on any one film, power relations
among various possible contenders for credit affect who is listed. Individual
workers with significant bargaining power (actors, directors, writers, and
producers) negotiate for specific treatment on each project, which may or may
not reflect the same level of artistic contribution as compared to others who
receive a similar type of credit on a different film or who receive the same
credit (or no credit) on the same film.71 For example, some screenwriters
complain that the credit system for screenplays is not sufficiently transparent
and favors successful writers at the expense of those without established
reputations.72 In addition, some complain about the rules for allocating credit
between first writers and rewriters, and between directors and producers on the
one hand and writers on the other.
In addition, some contributors to a project (lawyers, caterers, and
others) may be credited even though they are not subject to guild agreements
providing for credit. They may negotiate for credit in the contract in which
they agree to work on the project, or they may be given credit at the whim of
Film Producer as “Author,” 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 749 (1999). Leading cases
on screen credits include: Marino v. Writers’ Guild of America East, Inc., 992 F.2d
1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 2004); Williams v. UMG
Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
70
Bob Yari, a producer of Crash, has sued the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and
Sciences, seeking an injunction that producer credits be determined using a
transparent and fair process akin to those used to grant writing and directing credits.
See Peter Guber, Op-Ed, The Producers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at 15.
71
The WGA agreement, which allows individual writers to negotiate for terms better
than the collectively bargained minimum, specifically prohibits separate deals for
screen credit. The negotiation for screen credit happens in the interstices of the
system established by the WGA, not in derogation of it. See WGA 2001 Basic
Agreement, Art. 9.
72
Michael Alan Eddy sued the WGA over its refusal to allow Eddy to participate in
the credit arbitration for The Last Samurai. The federal judge dismissed the suit in
October 2004 on the ground that the guild has wide discretion in credit
administration. Dave McNary, Calmer Seas in New Year Daily Variety, Feb. 18,
2005, at A2.
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the producer or director as a form of thanks. There are significant differences
in the processes of credit attribution for star actors, directors, producers, and
writers than for the best boys, grips, set painters, and still another set of norms
governing credit for caterers, assistants, lawyers, and accountants.
The Writers Guild of America (WGA), the union representing 12,000
writers, administers the credit system for screenwriters. The collective
bargaining agreement between the WGA and the Alliance of Motion Picture &
Television Producers states that “credits for screen authorship shall be given
only pursuant to the terms of and in the manner prescribed in” the Theatrical
Schedule A, a thirty-page addendum to the Basic Agreement. Theatrical
Schedule A specifies the criteria for screen credit. Disputes over credit are
resolved pursuant to the WGA Credits Manual, which is not part of Theatrical
Schedule A but is approved by the WGA’s board of directors and by a vote of
the WGA membership.73 The WGA has a committee that decides which names
to submit to the studios to list as screenwriters. Theatrical Schedule A prohibits
screen credit to more than two writers “except that in unusual cases, and solely
as a result of arbitration,” three writers or “two writing teams” (each of which
can be no more than two writers) may be credited.74 It also states, however, that
the writers may agree among themselves as to screen credit if they agree
unanimously and so long as the number of credited writers and the form of
credit are consistent with Schedule A.75 Writers who disagree with the Guild’s
determination can seek arbitration. In 2002, 67 of 210 feature film writing
credits were arbitrated.76 The WGA is considering the possibility of including
“noncredited writers” in the end credits even if they are not listed in the
opening credits as the writers of the screenplay.77
As compared to some other credit systems, the Hollywood system
rates fairly high in terms of transparency, participation, equality, and due
process. Transparency is relatively high because the rules are written down,
and disputes over credit are covered in the press. Some degree of transparency
is likely to ensure both the fact and the appearance of fairness and regularity. It
is not entirely transparent, however. The identity of the WGA arbiters and the
73

See Marino v. Writers Guild of Am., East, Inc., 992 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993)
(describing WGA arbitration procedures).
74
Theatrical Schedule A paragraph 4.
75
Id. Paragraph 7.
76
Dave McNary, Credit Issues, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 18, 2003 at A10.
77
Id. See also Zorianna Kit, Everyone Wants to Take Credit, THE HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER, Mar. 30, 1999 (describing the credit system for producers which. because
the Producers Guild is not a recognized union and has no contract with the studios,
operates without contractual constraint).
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names of writers in credit arbitrations are both kept secret. There are good
reasons for this; arbiters are insulated from pressure and the anonymity of
claimants helps ensure that decisions are not affected by favoritism.
Participation is high because the right to establish the rules is
collectively bargained between the producers and the guild. The rules for
allocating credit and for resolving disputes about it are developed by the guild,
approved by the guild’s board, and voted on by entire guild membership.
Equality and fairness are fairly high, at least at a formal level, because the
arbitration process aims to ensure that screenwriting credit is given in
proportion to the size and significance of contributions, and the small number
of arbitrators who do these cases tends to result in consistency across cases. In
practice, however, a lack of equality is one of the most common complaints
about the system. Due process is high because there is a three-step arbitration
process. Because the system costs significant time and effort, the credit system
seems to work only for those contributors (directors, producers, writers, and
actors) for whom the financial value of credit is large enough to make it
economically sensible to invoke the whole cumbersome process.
The credit system for others seems to be more governed by norms,
charity, and power than by law, although there may be some way in which
allocation is done in the shadow of the law because of a culture of regularity (if
one exists) and the possibility that a guild will make noise about it. Stopmotion animator Mike Jittlov had a contract with Disney that provided no
credit to him as an animator. So he spelled out his name in the parade of
marching toys that he animated.78 Also the system depends on existence of
guilds and sophisticated lawyers on both sides both in the negotiating of guild
agreements and in negotiating individual contracts – repeat players. In short,
the screen credit system in Hollywood for most contributors looks rather unlike
the credit system in other industries.
2.

Science and Medicine

Attribution in the physical and biological sciences, as well as in the
social sciences, exhibits many of the same the same characteristics one sees in
Hollywood. Attribution is valuable and is explicitly recognized by everyone to
be divorced from intellectual property ownership. Large-scale collaborations
are common, and there is a perceived need to have rules and processes for
attribution that are more or less uniform throughout the “industry,” so to speak.
It is not enough, that is, for each university or laboratory to have its own
78
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attribution system; the attributions are relied on and therefore must be reliable
to outsiders throughout the field.79
Science and medicine use several formal and informal methods of
attributing work. The problem of attributing authorship and credit in science
has recently gained significant attention within scientific communities and
among scholars of intellectual property and related fields.80 One reason
scientific attribution has received so much attention is that in the scientific field
intellectual property rights and attribution rights are so clearly separate. Unlike
popular books, films, magazines, or most other copyrighted works, scientific
publications (like much academic writing) are usually far less valuable as
intellectual property than as claims to truth. In addition, most university and
corporate scientists who develop patented inventions have agreed as a
condition of employment to assign the patent to their employer or funding
source. Thus, the value of scientific authorship is widely recognized to be in
the attribution, not in the intellectual property. Because the value of attribution
is great, attribution has gained attention. But in science, unlike in other
academic fields, a large amount of the work is collaborative, and so the need
for and difficulty of making attribution are great as well.
As collaborative research mushroomed in the late twentieth century,
the listing of authors and contributors in articles published in scientific journals
was perceived, at least by journal editors, as in something of a crisis in the
early 1980s, and it prompted an effort to change and regularize the norms of
attribution.81 Science thus offers a unique case study of the failure of one set of
attribution norms and an attempt to replace them with new norms and more
enforcement. The list of perceived problems that led to the change is long but
it is important to consider it in some detail. Among the problems were disputes
over whom to include as authors, and in what order. More significant from the
79
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standpoint of third parties was the inconsistency of the significance of the order
of listing from one institution to another prevented one from using the order of
author names as evidence of the degree of contribution.82 Another problem
was scientists faking data then including another scientist as a “guest author” to
improve credibility. Relatedly, journal editors were concerned that companies
were paying academics to put their name on studies conducted by the
companies’ researchers. A more serious though less prevalent problem was
that no one knew whom among dozens of authors to hold accountable for
incorrect or fraudulent results; even legitimate co-authors could not guarantee
the integrity of other authors’ work on the project. From the standpoint of
universities and funding sources, a large number of authors made it difficult to
detect when the same research was published multiple times with different
authors listed, and academic promotion committees had a hard time evaluating
scholars based on number of publications rather than amount of work done.
Junior scholars and graduate students complained about not getting any credit
when only the senior researchers’ names were put on publications;83 In
addition, there were concerns that researchers needed to disclose both their role
in published studies and the funding source for the study in order to prevent
drug companies from both designing studies likely to favor the companies’
products and suppressing unfavorable results of studies.84
Responding to these concerns, and in particular to scandals having to
do with fraudulent data, the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors (ICMJE) published a set of criteria for listing authors of papers
published, and for ordering names in the case of multiple authors.85 The
success of the new rules in changing practices regarding listing authors and
other contributors is still being studied.86 What is clear is that the new rules
82

See David W. Shapiro, Neil S. Wenger & Martin F. Shapiro, The Contributions of
Authors to Multiauthored Biomedical Research Papers, 271 JAMA 438 (1994) (“the
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authorship or order of authorship”).
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Drummond Rennie, Veronica Yank, Linda Emanuel, When Authorship Fails: A
Proposal to Make Contributors Accountable, 278 JAMA 579 (1997). See also
Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance:
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Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1539 (2000).
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changed some norms of acknowledgement and authorship and improved the
clarity and consistency of attribution criteria.87
Although the norms of attribution in scientific publishing have been
formalized to increase transparency and equality, attribution through eponymy
remains ad hoc. There is the Salk polio vaccine, Fermat’s theorem, Boyle’s
law, Krohn’s disease, and the innumerable stars, plants, and other natural things
or phenomena named for their inventor or discoverer. Although studies of the
eponymous discovery phenomenon suggest some arbitrariness in the naming
process, discoveries have tended to be named for the researcher who: (1) made
the first reported observations of the phenomenon or filed the first case reports
or disease descriptions of the condition; (2) related isolated cases to one
disease, or recognized isolated phenomena as being part of one phenomenon;
(3) spent years of study and observation on the same phenomenon; (4)
developed a new procedure; (5) already was famous or prominent in the field;
or (5) described his or her own condition.88
The new rules for authorship in biomedical journals go some distance
toward achieving transparency, equality, efficiency, and substantive fairness.
There is some reason to believe that senior researchers still have substantial
and unreviewable discretion whether to credit junior scholars, graduate
students and postdocs, and thus abuses may remain. While there is no
evidence that all interested groups were represented in the development of the
criteria, and thus participation at that level was low, there remain of course
possibilities for individuals to negotiate for credit on a case-by-case basis.
3.

Business

General Medical Journals with Different Author Contribution Forms, 292 J. AM.
MED. ASSN. No. 1 (2004). There are also studies of authorship patterns for journals
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Businesses attribute credit in collaborative projects to identify,
motivate, and reward productive, creative, and diligent employees. A number
of generalizations about the nature of credit can be made here; details about the
differences among industries are explored below. Rewards are usually in the
form of money or promotion. Indeed, monetary bonuses and promotions are
sometimes seen as proof of the existence of the contribution rather than as
rewarding a contribution whose existence was proven on other grounds.89 The
bonus thus has a value, beyond the amount of the money paid, as a marker of
accomplishment. Non-monetary rewards are sometimes given: Some firms,
particularly in low-wage sectors, publicly praise the “Employee of the Week.”
The work of manufacturing employees is sometimes acknowledged to the
public by stamping the employee’s name on the product (which used to be
common on the bottom of paper bags) or in a package insert saying something
like “This product was assembled/inspected by Lucy X.” Many firms have
annual awards ceremonies. Valued employees are singled out for praise in
newsletters or over the company email system. Annual performance appraisals
of employees are often used to acknowledge good work. All of these
nonmonetary forms of credit are valuable both intrinsically and as signals of
underlying value.
Corporate attribution processes vary widely. When firms pay bonuses
in cash, ranging from the relatively modest sums to large payments, or give
stock options, they typically create some form of regularized process for
gathering information about employee performance. The criteria are typically
publicized to employees and efforts are made to achieve at least the appearance
of even-handedness and a fair process. Some attributions operate entirely
internal to the firm, like the Kodak reward system. Others operate on an
industry-wide basis. When bonuses are substantial, as is the case in law firms
and investment banks, there is sometimes litigation when a firm declines to
pay. In one case in which the hiring letter from a Japanese bank to a senior
equities trader promised a “discretionary bonus scheme which is not
guaranteed in any way,” and later fired the trader without paying a bonus
notwithstanding that he had earned substantial profits for the company, the
English High Court awarded damages of 1.35 million pounds. The court
explained that the refusal to pay “was plainly perverse and irrational and did
89

Terry Besser, Rewards and Organizational Goal Achievement: A Case Study of
Toyota Motor Manufacturing in Kentucky, 32 J. MGT. STUDIES 383 (1995); Allan
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not comply with the terms of the employer’s discretion.”90 Such cases are rare
because few employees are paid enough to make a bonus worth litigating over.
Consequently, attribution systems in most businesses remain largely outside the
purview of law. Examples of the operation of several different attribution
systems in different sectors of the economy follow.
Graphic Design and Advertising
Industry-wide attribution systems exist in the fields of graphic design
and advertising. Both sectors use credit in a way that emulates screen credit,
although the process for attribution is a less systematic and less transparent
than in Hollywood, and is not the product of formal negotiations between
management and employee representatives. As in Hollywood, projects in
graphic design and advertising tend to be collaborative, with many people
contributing ideas, technical skills, and work to produce a finished product. In
the past in graphic design, the annual industry honors for outstanding work (the
graphic design equivalent of the Oscars) usually attributed the entire work to
one star designer, the head of the design company, or to the company itself.
Recently, design annuals have tended to contain long credit listings similar to
screen credits in a film. Editors of the annuals who publish graphic design
works compile a hierarchical list of contributors. Originally the lists were
limited to art directors, designers, photographers, and illustrators, but recently
they have grown to include printers, paper manufacturers, copywriters, clients,
film separators, and even font designers.91
Similarly, advertising firms have begun crediting more contributions
than was common in the past. When a new advertising spot is released or
submitted for an award, the agency that produced it submits a formal credit list.
The industry practice is for the director of the group that developed the ad to
approve the credit list. Creative directors acknowledge that giving credit is
subjective. Inclusion on the credit list is important for job advancement, as a
standard procedure in a job interview is to show a book of ad campaigns on
which the applicant is credited. The expansion in who is credited, however,
can undermine the utility of the credit list; if the contributions of too many
people are listed, the ability to determine the extent of the contributions of any
one of them is compromised and people may conclude that any particular
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Lina Saigol, City Braced for Litigation on Bonuses, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 2,
2006 at 2.
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Zuzana Licko & Rudy VanderLans, Sins of Omission, 51 PRINT 20 (1997).
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person’s contribution was insignificant. As a consequence, word of mouth
remains an important way of verifying claims to credit.92
An absence of empirical studies of credit in these fields makes it
difficult to assess how well the systems operate. A lack of transparency and
participation by low-level employees suggest that there are a number of ways
in which credit in both graphic design and advertising can be misallocated. It
is difficult to verify contributions, the incentives for opportunism are great, and
even people acting entirely in good faith may have difficulty identifying who
did what on a project. It is unclear how well known the criteria for granting
credit are, whether they are relatively uniform, and uniformly followed, across
or within firms, and how much input employees have into defining and
applying the criteria. Thus it is difficult to assess how the systems rate in terms
of equality and due process. On the other hand, it may be that the informality
and flexibility allow the system to operate efficiently by calibrating the degree
of process in making credit determinations to the value of the credit in a
particular case.
Software and Information Technology
Many ways in which firms reward their employees generally are found
among computer and information technology businesses. They use credit to
motivate employees, to reward employees for particular contributions, and to
identify talent for internal promotion. Credit also serves as a form of
credentialing that facilitates firms’ assessment of job applicants from outside
the firm.93 Among the most common ways of acknowledging and rewarding
work are praise, gift certificates, bonuses for specific tasks or efforts, attention
from upper management, awards ceremonies, including the IT department in
important projects, stock options, and profit-sharing.94
92
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Software developers, unlike some other information technology
professionals, are hired to construct creative works. With a few exceptions,
programmers who write software for their company to sell generally are not
credited outside the company, in part to prevent competitors from luring away
employees.95 Internally, however, credit is given for a variety of purposes.
Source code comments are text added to the program’s code to help the people
who will maintain the code. It is considered good programming practice for
the person who writes a piece of code to put their name in a comment in the
source, and for subsequent programmers who modify the source to include
their names with the date and description of their changes.96 Companies use
credit as well as opportunities for employees to pursue their own ideas to
encourage innovation.97 Credit is so important that subversive claims to it it
are sometimes made. Computer programmers are known to hide amusing
screens called “Easter eggs” in their software, often listing the people who
wrote the software.98
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/06/13/24FEcompsurvey_1.html.
Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source Software, 50
J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 223-24 (2002). Adobe Acrobat 6.0 is one exception. Choosing
“About Adobe Reader 6.0” from the Help menu leads to a screen where the user can
see the list of everyone who worked on the product, from engineering to marketing.
See also Stuart Roch, The New Studio Model – A Search for Studiotopia, GAME
DEVELOPER, Oct. 1, 2004, at 16 (“Very often, [video game developers’] work is
hidden from view by publishers fearful of recruiters and competitive studios”);
Tamara Chuang, Video-Game Trailblazers Remember First Heyday of Home
Entertainment Trend, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 23, 2004 (noting that in the early
1980’s, the video game programmers at Mattel “weren't allowed to put their names
on games because Mattel feared that would attract headhunters scouting for other
game developers”).
96
Jack G. Ganssle, Comments on Comments, EMBEDDED SYSTEMS PROGRAMMING,
Mar. 1, 2002, at 73.
97
Evan I. Schwartz, Sparking the Fire of Invention, TECHNOLOGY REV., May 2004,
at 32. See also Shane Schick, Tough Times Put Innovation Under Scrutiny,
COMPUTING CANADA, Mar. 28, 2003, at 1. Occasionally, programmers have been able
to develop projects for their employers, on their own time, which they have sold to
their employers. See Steve Alexander, Arrested Development, COMPUTERWORLD,
Aug. 25, 1997, at 92 (citing a programmer who moonlighted, at his employer’s
request, to create a certain piece of software, for which he was paid about 10% of his
annual salary and was promoted into management).
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Russell Kay, Easter Eggs, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 18, 2000. “In the software
world, many programs are released simply under a company brand, with no mention of
the individuals who put in a lot of work on the product. So you often see Easter Eggs
listing the people who worked on the project as a sort of hidden "We made this!"
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Open Source Software
The open source software movement offers interesting examples of
how credit is given in an environment dedicated to free dissemination of ideas.
Open source software is software for which the source code is freely available
to the public: “everybody has the right not only to use the software, but also to
extend it, to adapt it to his or her own needs, and to redistribute the original or
modified software to others.”99 Social norms govern “ownership” of open
source code: owners are those recognized by the community to have the
exclusive right to distribute modified versions.100 Attribution is important to
many participants in the open source movement, even though exclusivity is
shunned. Code for open source projects is distributed with files listing the
names of contributors.101 Different projects describe contributions in different
levels of detail.102 According to open source norms, “Removing a person’s
name from a project history, credits or maintainer list is absolutely not done

signature.” The Easter Egg Archive: Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.eeggs.com/faq.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2005). See also David Pogue,
The 1998 Eggy Awards, MACWORLD, May 1998, at 170 (“In recognition of their lack
of recognition, programmers have learned to take matters into their own hands. . . . In
the lingo of programmers, they create Easter eggs. Now, because most software
companies frown on such frivolous expenditures of talent, programmers must hide
their Easter eggs (which is why they’re called Easter eggs)”).
Sometimes even those who write malicious code want credit for it. In 1992, a
group of self-proclaimed “virus authors” called Phalcon/Skism told a reporter at
Computerworld that they wrote viruses and post them to web boards in order to
impress the other members of the board. Although they hid their real names, they often
put their code names and the name of their group into the viruses they released.
Michael Alexander, Challenge, Notoriety Cited as Impetus for Virus Developers,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 10, 1992, at 1, 8.
99
Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some
Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 473, 475
(2003).
See also The Open Source Definition, version 1.9 at
http://opensource.org/docs/def_print.php (last visited June 13, 2005).
100
Eric S. Raymond, Homesteading the Noosphere, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 5, 1998, at
www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_10/raymond.
101
See Matthias Stürmer, Open Source Community Building, Mar. 2, 2005 at 17-18
at http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/sturmer.pdf at 124-146 (reporting interviews with
open source participants). The files are not necessarily kept up to date. When asked
about the credit system, Guido Wesdorp of open source browser editor Kupu said,
“Yes, we have a credits text file in the package. I don’t think it mentions all the
developers. Maybe I should correct that.” Id. at 128.
102
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without the person’s explicit consent.”103 Open source projects may also
acknowledge contributors by featuring them on the project’s website.104 There
is some evidence to suggest that some programmers participate in the open
source movement at least partly out of a desire to build their reputation.105 One
open source programmer explained the credits file has a “business value” to
him as a self-employed person: “This is my reference.”106 Others have
acknowledged the value of a reputation in the “gift culture” of open source,
where “social status is determined not by what you control but by what you
give away.”107 Although programmers often deny seeking reputation, the taboo
against removing someone’s name from a program is considered by some to be
103

Raymond, supra note 100 (emphasis in original). The credits files that are
distributed with open source licenses vary in terms of filename and format. Sometimes
the most significant contributors are listed in an “Authors” file, while others appear in a
separate file called “Thanks.” See also Stürmer, supra note 101, at 124 (quoting an
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the general population of consumers. On the range of motives for participating in the
Opens Source Movement, see Lerner & Tirole, supra note 95 at 218; Karim Lakhani
& Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and
Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, Sept. 2003, at
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Feb.
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explainable only by the desire for reputation, even if it is not accompanied by
monetary rewards. Apart from reputation, there is the universal acceptance of
the significance of credit as acknowledgement; one software developer said:
“As a contributor you feel like my contribution is appreciated.”108
One of the most common challenges facing an attribution scheme is
how to allocate credit and blame proportionately to the contribution to
counteract the normal tendency of people to claim credit broadly and blame
narrowly. Open source licenses are an example of an explicit effort to divorce
credit from blame in attribution. All open source licenses seek to prevent bad
modifications of the software from being attributed to the original authors.109
There are different restrictions on what kind of credit should be given to
contributors and whether modified code must have source code attached and a
license for further redistribution. One common open source license, the GNU
General Public License (GPL), requires that those who modify a GPL program
must put a notice in the source files declaring that they changed the file in order
that recipients of modified software “know that what they have is not the
original, so that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the
original authors' reputations.110 The Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD)
License, another common license used for free software, originally required
any advertising of software to contain the list of contributors to the software,
but this became unwieldy as contributor lists grew large, and it was finally
removed from the BSD license, although there are still software licenses
including the advertising clause. The BSD license contains a clause protecting
the original authors and contributors from being associated with a modified
file.111 The license used by the Apache Software Foundation (ASF), a nonprofit organization which provides hardware and other infrastructure for open
source projects, requires anyone who modifies and redistributes the source
code to say that she changed the files and to include the copyright notices of
108
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the pre-existing software. 112 Disallowing names within the source files
prevents “the creation of personal islands within the codebase,” discourages
“the pattern where people try and touch as many files as possible to get their
name in as many files as possible,” and directs all liability to the ASF rather
than to individual contributors.113
Creative Commons, like the open source movement, is a nonprofit
organization dedicated to free dissemination of copyrighted works. Creative
Commons attaches a notice to books and other materials that it distributes
stating that while users are free “to copy, distribute, display, and perform the
work,” they must “give the original author credit” by attribution.114 It used to
allow contributors to the site to disclaim attribution, but since virtually every
contributor wanted attribution, they changed their default license option to
include attribution.
The experience of organizations devoted to a robust public domain
suggests that even those devoted to minimizing intellectual property rights still
insist on attribution. Attribution is valued such that contributors must
specifically choose to alienate their right to it, and the various organizations
have developed a variety of creative, administrable, but in some cases fairly
complex credit systems. The attribution regimes appear to be relatively
transparent to those who work in software and information technology. The
112
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information about what they changed, when they changed it, and who wrote the
original code. Like the others, the MPL also contains explicit denials of warranty
and liability.
Mozilla Public License version 1.1 § 7, 9, available at
http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/MPL-1.1.html (last visited June 13, 2005); see also
Open
Source
Initiative
OSI
–
Licensing,
at
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/index.php (last visited June 13, 2005).
114
See, e.g., Creative Commons Deed Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0.
See www.creativecommons.org. A sample of the attribution deed is found in Eric
von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (MIT Press 2005), which is available at
http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/democ.htm.

CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE

43

apparent lack of hierarchy within open source organizations suggests a
reasonable degree of participation and equality in defining when and how
credit will be given in open source as compared to for-profit software
development firms. The attribution systems both at traditional firms and within
open source seem reasonably efficient. There is no data on how disputes over
credit are resolved, nor is it clear whether false claims of credit are made and
what happens if they are. While this evidence does not suggest that rights of
attribution can never be inalienable, or that the informal and norms-based
regimes by which attributions are made need legal intervention, it does suggest
that copyright licenses are an area where legal rights to attribution should exist.
Journalism
Norms vary and have evolved in the field of print and broadcast
journalism as to when attribution should be made. Generally, the trend in
journalism, as with other business sectors, appears to be in the direction of
giving credit to more contributors. For example, Time Magazine did not give
bylines until the 1970s, and then at first only to critics.115 The New York Times
is the most prominent example. Its practice of expanding attribution appears to
be partly a change in the traditionally hierarchical culture in which only a very
small number of writers had bylines and people could write for the paper for
years without ever seeing a byline. The change is partly a response to recent
controversies about falsified stories and inaccurate attribution. For all these
reasons, the paper increasingly credits, both by a byline at the beginning of a
story and through acknowledgement of contributing writers and researchers at
the end, several people who contributed to a story in different degrees.116 One
such controversy illustrates the possibility either that norms are evolving or that
abuses are now coming to light. Rick Bragg, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter,
was accused of using uncredited “stringers” to assist in the preparation of
articles. The stringers conducted research out in the field, interviewed sources,
and write some text of the story. According to reports, Bragg then would fly in
to the location at the end, complete the story, and file it under his byline with
the remote dateline. Although Bragg argued that his use of stringers was
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consistent with common practice and was known to his editors, he nevertheless
resigned his position with the Times.117
Newspaper writers, including at the prestigious New York Times, Wall
Street Journal, and Washington Post, occasionally deploy deliberate
nonattribution, known as a byline strike, as a way of publicly protesting
objectionable workplace policies. In a byline strike, reporters refuse to allow
their bylines to be published, counting on the importance of their bylines to
savvy newspaper readers to alert readers to their complaints about the way
management handled employment contract negotiations.118 Although reporters
have no contractual right to prevent attribution, in byline strikes the
newspapers accede to their wishes “in the interest of avoiding unnecessary
controversy.”119 The success of such tactics suggests that all parties are aware
that individual attribution is an important aspect of a newspaper’s credibility.
In broadcast journalism, the norms of attribution, particularly of
contributing writers, are quite different.120 It is common not to credit writers or
researchers, perhaps because it is thought to be more distracting to use scarce
air time to recite the names of people who contributed to a story.121 Perhaps
the issue of uncredited contributors has yet to achieve the status of scandal
because people do not tend to assume that the person who reports a story on the
air necessarily wrote the story in the way that readers think equate a byline
with exclusive authorship.
The most well-known example that maintains a norm of nonattribution
is the weekly newsmagazine (which calls itself a newspaper), The Economist.
It uses no bylines except, by tradition, on articles written by editors on the
117
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occasion of their departure from the position. The names of editors and
correspondents are found on the staff pages of the The Economist’s website,
but the publication does not credit articles to individuals in order “to speak[]
with a collective voice,” and to reflect that articles are often collaborative
projects among multiple writers and editors, and, most importantly, to maintain
the “belief that what is written is more important than who writes it.”122
Regardless of the practices with respect to crediting researchers,
writers, editors, or producers to the public, there are norms that govern the
claiming of credit or responsibility for collaborative projects within the
industry, and these norms influence how reputations are made both within an
organization (who the paper will nominate for a Pulitzer Prize, who it will
promote) and to others in the industry (who wins a Pulitzer or other prize; how
a journalist moves from one job to the next).123 It is in this context that the
inalienability of credit matters in the creation of human capital. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that many journalists have experienced perceived unfairness
and have felt that there was little recourse for them.124
There appears to be two fairly clear tiers with respect to journalist
attributions and the six fairness and efficiency criteria. Overall the system
seems to operate quickly and cheaply, and thus seems fairly efficient, given the
substantial importance both to individuals and to the organizations. Recognized
journalists have good information and quite a bit of power about bylines and
thus the norms with respect to them appear to rate high on the scale of
transparency, equality, participation, due process, and substantive fairness.
With respect to stringers and junior reporters, the situation seems quite
different. For example, The New York Times credits stringers or free lancers
122
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only in rare cases where “their pieces reflect unusual enterprise or unusual
writing style,” which appears to be a discretionary determination of editors
over which employees have little influence.125
4.

Politics and Government

The norms of attribution within the vast bureaucracies of government
are fascinating and have been much in the news lately as Americans have tried
to figure out whether to attribute memos written by young Justice Department
lawyers to them later in their careers as they have been nominated for positions
on the Supreme Court, or whom to hold accountable for memos advocating the
legality of torture. Anyone who has worked for a government knows the
multiple functions of author identification. The memos are almost always
written to advise someone in a decisionmaking capacity about what the
government’s official position or course of action should be; they usually do
not represent the views of the decisionmaker until approved. The actual
author(s) is/are identified so that the higher-ups know to whom to direct
questions, which people are behind the work (which may say something about
credibility), which department an initiative is coming from, and often who has
reviewed and approved the contents. But government employees know that
memos are sometimes used to assess the analytic or research abilities of the
employees who wrote them, and authorship of an important memo can be a
status marker.
Speech writers
Speech writers present an interesting example where there is obviously
a norm of non-attribution. This is an area where we’re prepared to allow
people to contract for anonymity, or, rather, for the transferability of attribution.
We attribute a politician’s speeches to the politician, not to the speech writer.
The alienability of attribution allows speech writers to earn a living and
politicians to spend less time crafting speeches and more time on other tasks.
Moreover, politicians can articulate more finely nuanced positions, and do so
more eloquently, than if they had to write their own speeches. Of course, they
could still do all that even if they had to give credit to speech writers. One
might argue that in a regime in which voters, commentators, and the press treat
speeches as evidence not merely of the policy agenda of the administration but
also of the personality of the person, transferability of attribution may
encourage an undesirable laziness in the way we think about politics and
125
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personality. We get away with it only by forgetting that the politician who
gives a speech, especially when the politician has a large staff of advisers,
speech writers, issues advisors, etc., is more of a spokesperson for group than
an individual whose personal qualities (whether of intelligence, folksiness,
judgment, or personal rectitude with respect to matters financial or sexual),
somehow makes him or her more or less fit to govern. In other words, the
complex of norms and contracts that enables the complete transferability of
attribution in speech writing may facilitate a cult of the personality in politics
that we would be better off without.
In contrast to Hollywood, where a norm of attribution humanizes a
product by reminding the viewing public that real people are behind the
massive fantasy of movies, the norm of non-attribution is what seems to the
voting public to humanize politicians. A really good speech or turn of phrase
(“Ask not what your country can do for you”; “The only thing we have to fear
is fear itself”; “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”) can become an emblem of
the person, not merely the policy proposal of the administration.126 Yet the
relationship between attribution and the humanity of the participants in a
collaborative process is complex. A recent memoir by a ghost writer who
made a respectable income for several years ghost writing not merely official
writings and speeches but also love letters and personal correspondence,
suggests that the ghost writing experience had some degrading qualities both
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for herself and for the person for whom she wrote.127 A ghost, after all, is
usually portrayed as a hollowed out human being who is not really alive. In the
case of the ghost writer, the memoir makes clear that both the writer and the
person who hired her were ghosting.
Judicial Opinions
Judges traditionally receive substantial and largely uncredited
assistance from law clerks in drafting opinions, even if judges decide for
themselves how the case should come out. There are good reasons (apart from
tradition) for the norm of non-attribution. The authority of judges might be
doubted if it were commonly recognized that recent law school graduates do
much of the work of providing reasons. It is difficult to separate the idea from
its execution, and thus hard to attribute responsibility for the decision on each
point, the original articulation of rationale, the evolving reasoning through
multiple revisions, and the final wording. It is both psychologically and
politically desirable to encourage law clerks to elide their role in persuading the
judge, for if clerks could publicize their disagreement with their judge, judges
might either be less candid with their clerks or would have to defend their
reasons other than just in the written opinion. Most lawyers and judges regard
both the role of the law clerk in drafting and the norm of non-attribution as
unproblematic in most cases, although some judges have remarked publicly
that judges should eschew clerk drafting of opinions. And even those judges
who find it unproblematic to have clerks draft substantial portions of opinions,
or at least early drafts of opinions, would likely be troubled if a judge delegated
the entirety of the opinion-writing task in every case to clerks.128
There is an interesting norm of attribution regarding clerks’ work.
While it is entirely acceptable to note which judge one clerked for during
which term, many consider it poor form for a former clerk to say anything
about one’s work beyond “My judge had before her the case of So and So v.
Such and Such, or maybe, I worked with my judge on So and So v. Such and
Such. Yet hiring decisions for people who clerked are explicitly made on the
assumption that during the clerkship the law clerk received valuable training
about legal analysis and learned how that judge, and perhaps others on the
same court, approaches cases, and that the former clerk will, in the new job,
impart that knowledge to his or her law practice colleagues or students.
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(Non)Attribution norms in politics and government are perhaps the
most troubling to assess in terms of the fairness and efficiency criteria because
we recognize both the desirability that government speak with an official voice,
rather than the voices of many individuals, and the desirability that government
be accountable. Here, too, there is a tension between the view that government
requires a heightened sense of confidentiality and secrecy to protect the candor
and efficacy of deliberations of government from undue influence and outside
threat and the countervailing view that in a democracy transparency and
accountability are essential.
5.

Professional Certification

In contrast to the worlds of business and academia, where attribution is
governed only by norms or by contract (as in the case of Hollywood), the
professions have legally mandated requirements of attribution as well as
norms. The legal requirements of attribution are almost uniformly designed to
enforce the disciplinary function of attribution, the norms of attribution operate
pretty much as they do in other sectors, as rewards and as brands. Because the
legal requirements of attribution are distinct, it is to those that I devote the most
attention here.
All U.S. states have statutes for professional registration of building
design professionals such as architects and engineers.129 The basic principle in
most states is that each architect and engineer who is licensed to design
buildings and structures has a seal which law requires that he or she affix to
plans, drawings, specifications or other formal design documents to certify that
architect or engineer personally prepared or reviewed it. For example, in
Indiana the engineer’s seal “attests that: (1) The work embodies the
engineering work of the registrant; (2) the registrant or an employed
subordinate supervised by the registrant prepared the documents . . . (3) The
registrant assumes full professional responsibility for the documents; and (4)
The work meets standards of acceptable engineering practice.”130 Licensing
boards in many states are empowered to take action against an architect who
uses his or her seal or allows it to be used on documents that the architect has
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not personally prepared or supervised the preparation of.131 Engineers and
architects have been disciplined by licensing boards for allowing their seal or
signature to be used for plans they did not create and for which they did not
supervise the drawing. Though rarely imposed, criminal sanctions for misuse
of a seal also exist in many states.132
The responsibility of engineers for defects in buildings has at times
been a subject of some controversy within the professional engineering circles.
A particularly revealing example arose from the collapse of a suspended
walkway in a Hyatt Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, in which 114 people were
killed and nearly 200 were injured. The incident raised questions about
whether accepting responsibility for the defects was a price to be paid by the
engineers.133
The cause of the collapse may have been that in the rush to complete
the hotel building on a fast track, the engineers left unspecified (that is, for the
fabricators to work out) a detail about how suspended walkways were to be
connected to the supporting rods. The engineers’ sketch suggested a single set
of rods should connect the walkways to the ceiling but on the construction site
it became apparent that such a design was unworkable so two sets of rods were
used. During construction, engineer Daniel Duncan was asked about the
design change six times, and each time said that the change was safe. Jack
Gillum, the head of Duncan’s firm, placed his seal on the documents as the
engineer of record.
After the walkway collapsed, no criminal charges were filed against
the engineers, and insurance companies settled the civil suits. The Missouri
licensing board did, however, revoke the two engineers’ licenses. The
licensing board rejected the defense that the project was too complex for the
engineers to have personally checked every detail and found Duncan guilty of
gross negligence because he made assurances about the safety of the design
without actually checking it.134 Gillum was found responsible as well, based
131

Wyoming Statutes § 33-4-115. Pennsylvania’s licensing board can take action
against “[a]n architect who impresses his seal or knowingly permits it to be
impressed on drawings, specifications or other design documents which were not
prepared by him or under his personal supervision.” 63 P.S. § 34.12.
132
STEIN, supra note 129 at § 1.01[c] & n.65.
133
This account of the incident is drawn from Sarah K. A. Pfatteicher,“The Hyatt
Horror”: Failure and Responsibility in American Engineering, 14 J. PERFORMANCE
CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES 63 (2000), and from Duncan v. Missouri Board of
Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 524 (1988).
134
744 S.W.2d at 541.

CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE

51

on the licensing law that held a professional engineer “responsible for the
contents of all” documents he sealed.135 The Court of Appeals of Missouri, in
affirming the licensing board’s decision to revoke both engineers’ licenses,
explained that “the whole thrust of” the law requiring engineers to put their
seal on plans “is to place individual personal and professional liability upon a
known and certificated engineer.” In the court’s view, the statute authorized
discipline of “the engineer responsible for the project whether the improper
conduct is that of himself or attributable to the employees or others upon whom
he relies.”136 Other state licensing boards also revoked Gillum’s and Duncan’s
licenses.137 The American Society of Civil Engineers’ Committee on
Professional Conduct found Gillum “vicariously responsible . . . but not guilty
of gross negligence nor of unprofessional conduct” and suspended him for
three years.138 Duncan was not a member of the ASCE, so his liability was not
addressed by that organization.
There are multiple reasons and many norms governing when a
professional will put her name on a case. Lawyers want their names on
pleadings to make a reputation and as a measure of their hard work and to have
some control over the course of litigation. Judges use the names on briefs as a
measure of the importance the case and the reliability of the arguments made,
and other lawyers use the names on pleadings, like doctors use signatures on
medical records, as a way to know whom to contact in case of questions. But
where law requires the naming of the professional, it is usually for purposes of
accountability for poor work. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires lawyers to sign all court filings in order to hold accountable
those who sign frivolous filings, is another form of professional certification
designed to attribute poor work for the purposes of deterrence and
punishment.139 The legislatures that enacted the engineer and architect’s seal
135
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regulations and the Advisory Committee that adopted Rule 11 deemed neither
the norms of professional competence and zeal nor the reputation costs of
ineptitude, nor even possible malpractice liability sufficient to counteract the
incentives for misfeasance.
Greater transparency, equality, and due process were thought necessary
when putting a name on a case would be the basis for punishment, and thus it
was in these cases where legislatures decided that the norms-based systems of
attribution were inadequate. With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
the wake of the Enron scandal, we see a similar instinct: greater individual
accountability is necessary in some work environments where wrongdoing can
be too easily buried in collective responsibility.140 Given the serious
punishments that violations of these statutory attribution systems can visit,
transparency and due process are valued highly. In all of these areas,
legislatures imposed a requirement of individual attribution with greater
attention to transparency, equality, and due process than previously exhibited
by the norms-based systems. They did so for the purpose of disciplining
offenders.
*

*

*

One of the most intriguing things about the attribution regimes
described above is the variety and nuance that exists for making attributions.
Norms perform credit, blame, branding, and humanizing functions for a welter
of collaborative projects. In a few areas (such as professional responsibility)
norms are supplemented but not supplanted by laws, and when they are the
requirements of equality and transparency are taken very seriously. Across
fields over the last generation there has been a tendency to expand the number
of people and the types of contributions that are attributed. Credits have grown
longer and more elaborate in the movies and in advertising and graphic design;
more researchers are acknowledged in print journalism and in science. The
expansion of attribution may be because the financial rewards for attribution
have increased, and it may be in part because workplace hierarchies are less
stable in a post-60’s culture than they used to be. As attribution has grown
more prevalent, norms have adjusted to explain, with the appropriate nuance,
where and to what degree blame will be allocated when a project fails.
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When and Why Attribution Regimes Fail

Most existing attribution schemes have significant flaws, and the flaws
matter. In this section, I attempt to generalize about when false attributions are
problematic and to suggest that the failures of existing norms-based or
contract-based attribution systems are neither isolated nor inconsequential. In
the first part, I describe, from the perspectives of employees, employers, and
third parties, why attribution problems exist and attempt to generalize about
what causes the problems. In the second part, I theorize about why the
problems are examples of market failure and consider other arguments for legal
regulation.
A.

Why Attribution Failures Occur and Why Failures Matter

From the perspective of employees who contribute to group projects,
attribution problems occur in a number of circumstances for several reasons
but they can all be boiled down to two. First, the most common complaint is
that attribution is wrongly made between people of dramatically unequal social
or economic power. The abuses of power are difficult to check in the privacy
of interpersonal work relationships when others cannot monitor who did what
on a project. The supervisor often has the power to make or break a young
person’s career through promotion, firing or giving a positive or negative
review; the young worker often does not have the power to challenge her.
Graduate students often feel themselves too dependent on the good will of the
senior professor to challenge his or her claim of credit for work that should
properly be attributed to the student. Particularly in the case of graduate
students or junior faculty, it is simply not an option to go work elsewhere when
a false claim of credit is made. The norms of the work relationships may frown
on job changes, and the labor market for graduate students or junior faculty
often make a job switch impossible after only a short period of employment.141
A second and related complaint about attribution is arbitrariness.
Among the circumstances in which it is possible that attribution will be
wrongly made, employees have difficulty knowing in advance how attribution
will be done. Two journalists whom I interviewed for this project told a similar
story of when they were young reporters free-lancing for newspapers in
different cities. Each researched and wrote newspaper stories that wound up
getting a fair amount of attention in the newspaper. One journalist said that the
141
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editor who assigned her the project said that the story was too important to be
published under the byline of a free-lance writer whom no one had ever heard
of, so he put his byline on it instead. The journalist said she felt there was no
one in the newsroom to whom she could complain about the incident because
either people would not believe her, or higher-ups would agree that the
credibility the story (and hence the newspaper) would gain from being
published under an established byline was more important than her career. She
also feared alienating the writer/editor on whom she depended for more
assignments and for her hope of career advancement within the paper. The
other journalist said that he was in a similar situation except that the senior
writer who assigned the project said: “you need this byline to make your
reputation, and I don’t. Let’s put your name on it.” The disparity in treatment
of the two journalists illustrates the problem of arbitrariness in who is credited
and who is not, depending on the good will, whim, or conscience of senior
workers.
One might say that the market will correct for both the abuse of power
and the arbitrariness of attribution.
That is, powerful people who
opportunistically but inaccurately claim credit will get a bad reputation and
have difficulty attracting talented young collaborators. The problem is that it is
often difficult for junior people to know which people to avoid and, once they
have stumbled into a relationship where inaccurate claims are made, to correct
the record. An example from Hollywood illustrates the difficulty of correcting
the record. The WGA arbitration process determined that Susannah Grant
wrote the script for Erin Brockovich, and that the contributions of the rewrite
by Richard LaGravenese were simply mild restructuring and some new
dialogue which did not amount to a fifty-percent revision necessary for screen
credit. Nevertheless, Julia Roberts (whose every word is widely reported in the
press) said when she received an Oscar and in many other contexts that
LaGravenese had written or co-authored the script. This prompted Grant to
lament: “It’s incredibly painful and galling for people to say that the best work
you ever did was written by somebody else. . . . [O]ther than carrying scripts
around in my handbag and saying to every person I meet, ‘Here are the three
drafts I wrote, and I’d like you to spend seven hours reading them,’ there’s
nothing I can do.” Of course, Grant did get the sole screen credit and was
nominated for an Oscar, so she fared much better than most whose work is not
correctly attributed. But even she claims her reputation suffered. One of the
reasons that workers in Hollywood like the public aspect of screen credit is that
it creates certainty – once you’re listed on screen, it is difficult (though not
impossible as the Susannah Grant episode illustrates) for credit to be taken
away on a whim.
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One final note about these employee concerns about attribution: the
harm may be more than just hurt feelings or lost earnings, although those can
be nontrivial. Employees aware of the risk of misattribution, especially if they
believe it cannot be prevented or remedied, experience anxiety. Moreover, the
fear of an inaccurate reference can prompt people to avoid making desirable
job switches. Misattribution is a particularly severe restriction on labor market
mobility, and in today’s economy that mobility is particularly valued as an
engine of economic growth. An emerging literature suggests that today’s
employees face greater risks than at any time in the last half century, and they
know it.142 Periods of unemployment last, on average, fifty percent longer now
than in the 1970s, and a smaller percentage of unemployed people receive
unemployment insurance now as compared to the 1940s. Employees are being
asked to be entrepreneurial in many aspects of their lives, including in being
willing to switch jobs, retrain, and fund their own health care and retirement
through investment savings accounts, so they need to believe that they will
have the ability to compete in the labor market. Of course, anxiety about
attribution is only a small part of what makes the modern labor market risky.
Nevertheless, employees are more motivated when they believe they will get
credit for good work and not be falsely blamed for bad work. In this respect,
accurate attribution is to employee effort as the stability of legal regimes or
security of property rights are to investment: all are important to encouraging
effort and entrepreneurship.
From the perspective of employers, false attributions present different
problems. Prospective employees have incentives to lie on their resumes about
all kinds of things: whether or where they got academic degrees, the nature
and extent of prior work experience, and why they left past jobs. Employers
complain that while some resume fraud can be detected with some time or
expense (you can confirm whether someone graduated from a university,
though often not what their grades were), it is difficult to detect deception
about past work experience because prior employers often decline to give
detailed job references describing what the employee did and why they left.
Trademark law exists because of the possibility of passing off one type of good
as something else. But there is no trademark law that applies to employees.
Many firms decline to give job references (perhaps fearing defamation suits for
negative references), and even when references are given there is no guarantee
of reliability, as no jurisdiction provides for liability for a falsely positive
reference absent intentional fraud likely to cause serious harm. There is in
142
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most jurisdictions no cause of action against a former employer for
misrepresenting or failing to disclose the known defects of a former employee
and no cause of action against an employee for lying on a resume.143
Employers also experience attribution problems with respect to
evaluating current employees. Supervisors can take credit from or pass blame
to subordinates without easy detection from upper management. The difficulty
with attribution is not merely a problem of bad faith but one of institutional
design. Participants in some group projects often do not know exactly what
their contributions are. Ex ante, they don’t know what the project will entail,
how long it will take, who will contribute how much in terms of time, useful
ideas or skills along the way, or even whether the project will succeed enough
to make it worth thinking about who did what. Ex post, people have a hard
time reconstructing what their contribution was, and psychological literature
shows a tendency of people to exaggerate (in their own mind) their successful
interventions and to forget their failures. Some of the literature even suggests
that it is entirely rational for participants to exhibit this form of overconfidence
in their abilities and skill.144 The ex post problem thus will matter both when a
project succeeds past the creators’ expectations and fails in unanticipated ways.
When the project succeeds, collaborators will come out of the woodwork to
claim credit, and when it fails, collaborators will disappear just as quickly to
143
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avoid blame.145 Objective measures of accomplishment can sometimes be
verified, but subjective measures are notoriously difficult without direct
observation, and even with direct observation it is often difficult to assess the
use of tacit knowledge.146 Employers thus face significant obstacles to getting
accurate information about employees.
Third parties also have interests in accurate attribution and are harmed
when false claims are made. A plumbing contractor who hires an inept
plumber hurts not only his reputation but his clients. Attribution issues in
science undermine the integrity of research. In theory, scientists share credit
with collaborators, cite data from competing labs, acknowledge contributions
from students, and make their work available to others. In practice, scientists
often feel pressure to claim individual credit that may not be individually
deserved in order to secure access to grant funding, to gain promotion or
tenure, to secure prestigious publications that will aid in the wide dissemination
of their research, or to recruit high-quality graduate and post-doctoral students
for the laboratory.147
B.

Why Legal Regulation of Attribution is Desirable
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The nature of a resource should define the rights to it. The commodity
value of credit is informational. Credit loses its value, at least to some
consumers and to the producer, if it is transferred because accurate information
is lost. An argument might be made that the right to attribution must be
nontransferable in any circumstance in which the value of accurate attribution
is greater than the value of misattribution. I do not argue that all forms of
attribution must be inalienable: there should remain a role for informal
collaboration, speech writers, anonymous authors, and uncredited research
assistants, muses, and amanuenses. I also recognize that in many cases it is
difficult or impossible to define in advance of creation how credit will be
allocated, and once creation has occurred it is equally difficult to reconstruct
retrospectively who did what. Nevertheless, as we know from the variety of
attribution schemes that exist, it is both possible and desirable to achieve some
degree of certainty about who did what. When norms-based regimes fail, law
is a desirable supplement.
As has been shown, credit is valuable and, consequently, collaborators
often are tempted opportunistically to claim credit where it is not due. The
temptation cannot be fully controlled simply by voluntary agreement for
reasons encapsulated in two ordinary examples. (1) A supervisor promises to
credit an employee for her work but later decides to fire her for resisting his
sexual overtures and states in a job reference that she never did any work. The
supervisor has two incentives to lie: to enhance his own reputation for work
and to cover up his sexual harassment and retaliation against a subordinate. (2)
A corporation pays annual bonuses based on productivity. A supervisor or coworker claims a larger bonus for himself by taking credit for others’ work. To
the extent that credit is economically valuable and the accuracy of claims is
difficult to substantiate, it is likely that false assertions will be made. The more
valuable and untestable the claims about human capital, the greater the risk of
opportunism.
The need for legal regulation exists because some credit ought to be
inalienable, and yet the market fails reliably to produce information about who
deserves credit and who should be rewarded in such cases. Problems of
information asymmetry plague the proper allocation of credit. Outsiders to a
workplace may not have access to information about who did work. When an
employee goes into the labor market to find a new job, the prospective
employer may not be able to tell whether the accomplishments the employee
claims on his or her resume are exaggerated. The economic theory of the
“lemon market” suggests that when there is an information asymmetry, as
when only the seller knows whether a used car is a lemon, the market does not
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function efficiently because buyers discount the price they are willing to pay to
account for the possibility that the car is a lemon, but at the lower price sellers
of good cars are unwilling to sell and so more lemons will be offered for sale,
which scares off potential buyers even more. The problem is that sellers of
used cars know whether the car is good, but buyers do not, and if buyers cannot
trust sellers, then fewer cars will be sold than there would be if buyers could
figure out whether a car is a lemon. The market for prospective employees is
similar: the worker has better information than the prospective employer about
the worker’s capabilities, and the prospective employer cannot trust the
prospective worker.148
A mechanism to address the information problem is a signal that only
the good sellers can afford to make. For example, sellers of good cars can offer
warranties, but sellers of lemons cannot afford to do so. An enforceable
warranty operates as a reliable signal of quality and thus facilitates efficient
bargains. Accurate attributions of credit could operate as a signal to enable
prospective employers know whether a particular worker has the human capital
necessary to do the job. If credit attributions are not reliable, it is as if
warranties on used cars are not reliably legally enforceable: the signal does not
fix the lemon market problem. Without reliable signals of quality, prospective
employers cannot distinguish between high-quality and low-quality employees
and will hire fewer employees than they otherwise would.
The question is how to make credit attributions more a reliable signal.
Given the unwillingness of many employers to provide detailed references, the
challenge is to come up with other reliable evidence of employee contributions
to collaborative projects. In theory the creator could produce drafts, laboratory
notebooks, or other evidence to prove her work, but in practice it is often not
possible to do so. As Susannah Grant explained, you can’t always ask people
to spend seven hours reading the multiple drafts of a collaborative project to
figure out your contributions to it. Moreover, the norms of hierarchy and
confidentiality often prevent an employee from showing past work product.
An employee who quits or is fired usually is prohibited by the former employer
from removing any documents or computer files when she leaves and thus will
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have no way to refute the former employer’s false attributions of credit for
work the former employee did. Trade secret law, work product privilege, or a
contractual duty of confidentiality may prevent revelation of the information.
In any event, it is a slow and therefore expensive way of signaling ability. For
a high velocity labor market to operate efficiently, information about
prospective employees must be quick and cheap to obtain. When the volume
of resume checks goes up, as in the case in a labor market with high turnover,
even small obstacles to gaining information can add up to significant costs
associated with hiring.
In sum, existing attribution regimes suffer from generalizable
problems. Many of them function well much of the time, but there are
widespread reports of arbitrariness and exploitation about which we can
generalize. Problems occur when one member of a collaborative work
relationship uses the power she has through information asymmetries to behave
opportunistically and claim credit which is not due. Such opportunistic
behavior occurs when there is a huge financial incentive (as when an
innovation succeeds beyond anyone’s expectations) or some interpersonal
incentive (such as sexual exploitation or personality conflict). These problems
have no doubt existed since the beginning of time, but the economic harm they
inflict has grown in proportion to the economic importance of attribution in the
information economy. In work relationships where attribution is important, a
sense of some collaborators that attribution will be made unfairly will cause
problems going forward as collaborators will lose the incentive to contribute
fully because they know (or fear) they will not reap all the rewards of their
work. The hard question is whether there is a cure that legal regulation could
offer that is less harmful than the disease. It is to that which I now turn.
IV.

Towards a Theory of Fairness in Attribution

At this point in the project, I find myself with might be called a genre
problem. The convention for an article that recognizes some important new
interest is to do one of two things. Either the author proposes a bold new
scheme of legal regulation to turn the important interest into a legal right, or the
author concludes that the current regime is desirable – efficient, fair, or
whatever – and that the current state of the law is just right. My inclination,
unfortunately, is to do neither. So I will make a modest proposal, based largely
on the concept of implied contract, which attempts to preserve much of the
flexibility and local variation in norms-based systems while attempting to
minimize opportunism and other market failures. A comprehensive and legally
enforceable right of attribution, whether in the form of a new section of the
Restatement of Torts or in the form of a state or federal statute (the “Attribution
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Act of 2006”), is neither feasible nor probably desirable. Rather, I argue for
enforcement of party-defined attribution rights as an element of existing
employment contracts, and for loss of attribution rights to be recognized as a
form of harm that should be actionable and compensable under other protective
employment statutes or common law claims.
Even this modest proposal for greater legal regulation must consider
the likely impact of law on the current situation. It has been argued that
attribution should be left to these norms, enforced to the extent deemed
desirable by the professional associations or other work communities that are
“capable of considering the nuances of context, [rather] than the far more rigid
legal system.”149 There are many reasons to preserve a central role for norms
based attribution regimes. After sketching out those, I will explain how my
proposal can preserve many of them while remedying some of the most
significant problems outlined in Part III.
One of the benefits of the existing norms-based and contract-based
system is its flexibility. In a sector where credit is extremely valuable, as in
Hollywood, an elaborate and expensive regime can exist, and in sectors where
credit is less valuable, simpler and cheaper regimes exist. A flexible system
can adapt to changes in circumstances brought by new technology that enables
new ways of transmitting credit information, or new ways of identifying
contributors enabled by new work arrangements. Credit can be given one way
in one forum (as by putting a lawyer’s name on a pleading for Rule 11
purposes) and another way in another forum (as by acknowledging assistance
within a firm even when a name is not on a brief). Participants in a given work
culture are very good at learning the nuances of meaning in different forms of
attribution.
Informality in attribution may also play a crucial social-psychological
role in workplaces by allowing collaborators not to focus on the comparative
importance of their respective contributions. Institutionalizing a formal process
for crediting particular contributions to particular employees, particularly when
they work collaboratively, poses the risk that the collaborators will focus
excessively on thinking about the value of their work rather than on the work
itself. Just as there are costs in failing to take attribution seriously enough to
prevent false attributions, there are also costs in taking accuracy so seriously
that parties to a collaborative work relationship focus unduly on identifying
and seeking credit for their contributions. As explained above, even when
everyone is acting in good faith, it is often difficult to attribute work because
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before the creative process occurs it is difficult to negotiate in the abstract
about work that is not yet done, and afterward participants in group projects
consistently overestimate their contributions to a project when it succeeds and
underestimate their share of blame when a project fails.
Examples of the possible harms of excessive attention to attributing
performance of a group to contributions of individuals are not hard to find.
The business pages of the newspapers are full of examples of how executives
whose compensation is tied to share price manipulate share price through
short-term strategies at the expense of healthy growth for a firm. Another
example, still anecdotal but suggestive, comes from Japan. An employee who
led the team that invented the “Holy Grail of lighting technology,” the blue
light emitting diode (LED), sued his employer claiming a greater share of the
billions of dollars of profit than the $200 bonus he was paid.150 The Tokyo
High Court ordered the employer, Nichia, to pay the former employee nearly
$200 million under Article 35 of Japan’s patent law, which requires
“appropriate remuneration” for patents assigned to employers. The verdict
prompted a host of similar suits that eventually dramatically changed
compensation practices for employee inventors. The legal change also
prompted concern about a norm of selfless cooperation that some believe had
previously characterized Japanese corporate R & D. What had previously been
a collaborative work relationship, some feared, would become more rivalrous
when employees realized that they stood to reap enormous compensation gains
if they were identified as an “inventor” of the next valuable patent as opposed
to simply one of the team.151 The fear is not unreasonable: Once people
realize that attribution is a finite resource, as would be the case if there are set
rules defining who can be attributed in a particular role and who cannot, and if
the financial returns to attribution are significant, some people will focus on
their status as much as on the work itself. Whether such a change in norms has
occurred – and whether the norm of selfless cooperation ever existed – remains
uncertain.
The jockeying for position as the designated inventor, screen writer, or
project member will not occur at the beginning of a collaborative project. The
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reason is that the work group often (though not always) will not know in
advance whether there will be significant financial returns to attribution
because they won’t know whether the project will succeed. It is difficult to
negotiate ex ante about divvying up credit for something that has not been
created and may never be. So one would expect the serious effort to secure
attribution will occur towards the end of a collaborative process when it
becomes apparent that attribution might have significant payoff. There will
always be something retrospective about attribution. Thus it may be
particularly beneficial to have rules established before a project begins to
govern attribution to blunt the effect of the psychological tendency of people to
inflate their own positive contributions and minimize the negatives.
My survey of attribution norms throughout American society
convinces me that the degree to which and circumstances in which attribution
should be granted varies. Consequently, law should supplement but not
supplant the process by which work communities create norms of attribution.
To take just two examples, the fact that some news outlets have decided that
reporters will work best if work is attributed to them, and thus employee expect
fair attribution, should not render the business model of other news outlets
illegal. Hollywood’s labor market appears to be dependent on public
attribution; the job market for speech writers is not. One way that law can
honor expectations and prevent opportunism while allowing flexibility and
local variation is through contract. Contract law enables the parties to a
relationship to define their own obligations and then to seek enforcement when
one threatens to defect.
Contract law also has a mechanism to constrain private agreement
when there is a social interest in doing so by imposing terms that parties cannot
negotiate away. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is one; another is
the public policy against the enforcement of certain contracts. One cannot sell
oneself into slavery, sell one’s labor at less than the minimum wage, or agree to
a term of employment that would allow the employer to fire in retaliation for
whistleblowing or exercising a statutory right.
I propose that a right of attribution be regarded as an implied term of
every employment agreement. It might be analogous to the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as it is currently recognized in a few jurisdictions. Once
the employee has achieved a certain level of contribution to a project, the right
to attribution for it would be vested.
A right of attribution vis a vis the public would be waivable.
Depending on the custom in the industry, a waiver could be easy for an
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employer to secure (as in the case of speech writers or ghost writers), or hard
(as in the case of graduate student research assistants). In any context in which
attribution to the public is necessary to protect the labor market position of
contributors, waiver would be permissible only if the employer proved to the
court that a fair process was used and adequate compensation was offered to
secure the waiver. In that respect, it would resemble attribution in European
moral rights regimes.152
I expect problems to arise when firms, once they realize that
attribution rights are an implied term of employment agreements, attempt to
negotiate around the term by asking employees to sign express agreements
waiving attribution rights. This is not an unrealistic expectation: firms
routinely ask employees to sign express agreements waiving any possible just
cause protections and also waiving a right to sue in a judicial forum, as well as
waiving rights to intellectual property, to engage in post-employment
competition, and to use a wide range of knowledge or information that
employees would otherwise be entitled to use. I would expect, therefore, that
courts would confront claims of waiver of a right to attribution. In assessing
those claims, the court would examine the evidence of the work culture
according to the six criteria of transparency, participation, equality, efficiency,
due process, and substantive fairness to see whether the default rule of
attribution was validly waived.
A court will have to distinguish between work cultures where waiver
of a public right of attribution is easily proven (or perhaps, as in the case of
speech writers presumed) and those in which waivers should not readily be
found. When a court is asked to determine whether an employer’s failure to
give credit to an employee for work she did breached the implied term
regarding attribution, the court would first have to determine whether there is
an attribution right. That determination would look primarily to the norms of
the workplace, just as courts routinely examine the dealings of the parties and
the customs of the industry to give content to contracts.
The one sense in which attribution rights may never be waived is in the
sense that attribution becomes part of human capital and attribution must be
fairly given when a creator is seeking other employment. The Economist can
decline to give bylines but it cannot decline to acknowledge within its own
employee assessment processes or to prospective employers that one of its
correspondents wrote, edited, or researched the articles that she in fact did.
This limit on the alienability of attribution is not a significant change from
152
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common practice: a journalist whom I interviewed who wrote for The New
York Times but did not receive a byline said that he got his next job after the
Times by his editors acknowledging to editors at another paper which stories he
had written. What I propose that is new is nothing other than explicit legal
recognition for what is already a widely accepted norm of fair dealing and may
be considered by some to be an implied term of an employment contract.
The final question is how to conceptualize the remedy for the harm
caused by wrongful attribution. Here it matters that an attribution right is
conceived in contract rather than property terms. Unlike a property right, a
remedy for false attribution should not restrict access to or dissemination of the
product or project to which she contributed.153 Attribution rights should not be
an additional way to constrain the public domain and, thus, remedies for failure
to attribute should operate in a way to require limited compensatory or makewhole remedies to the claimant but not to enable the right-holder to restrict
access to the project. This is easy to see in a case in which the right of public
attribution is waived and only a right of human capital attribution exists (as in
the case of the journalist with no byline seeking another job).
The harder case is where the right of public attribution is not waived.
Let’s say, for example, that a software firm breaches the obligation to attribute
software in the manner done in open source. I propose that the software
designer be able to sue for some measure of loss of reputation, but not prevent
the software firm from distributing the mis- or unattributed software. A right of
attribution is not a right to exclude others from using, copying, or selling the
information. In this respect, it is not a property right in the intellectual property
sense or in the right of publicity sense. Nor would it be like joint authorship in
copyright, which is thought to entitle all joint authors to prevent any use of the
work with which they disagree and to reap an equal share of the profits from
the work.154 Neither would it include a right to prevent alteration in the way
that the moral right of integrity does. In short, a remedy for failure to attribute
should not be an injunction against distribution of the work without attribution,
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nor even necessarily a share of the profits from the project itself. Rather, it
would be a right to share the reputation benefits of authorship.
One way to think of the distinction is this. Intellectual property rights
are the right to a stream of revenue associated with the sale or use of the
information itself. Sales of a Disney movie or of the blue LED produce
millions of dollars, and the owner of the copyright or patent gets those dollars.
This is the right of exclusivity. Attribution rights are the rights to an entirely
different revenue stream: the financial rewards associated with being the
creative person behind the valuable idea. In other words, the right of
exclusivity is entirely distinct from the right of attribution, and the remedies for
infringement of the two rights are quite different. Thus, although Disney owns
the movie and the Japanese firm owns the LED, the screenwriter or animator
enjoys the financial or other benefits of being the person who did the work, and
that revenue is entirely divisible from the revenue attributable to the intellectual
property itself. It is important to recognize that whatever we may think about
remedies for copyright or patent infringement, including a right to a portion of
the revenue stream or even to block the revenue stream altogether by getting an
injunction against sales of the product, we could have a completely different
remedy structure for wrongful attribution.
An example of such a remedial structure in operation is Hollywood’s
screen credit system, which explicitly addresses the issue of remedies for
violations of the credit rules. The Writers’ Guild agreement prohibits claims of
screen credit that are in derogation of credit determinations made through its
processes. Nevertheless, the agreement also explicitly states that there shall be
no claim against the Guild, arbiters, or producers for errors in credit. Nor, to
my knowledge, has there been a case in which a remedy for an error in credit
involved blocking the distribution of the film or TV show.
Conclusion
As applied to credit, Shakespeare was right in the famous passage in
Othello, but he did not go far enough. Taking credit for someone else’s work
or wrongly besmirching another’s reputation at work certainly does impoverish
the person whose good name was filched. Besmirching is costly to reputation,
market status, and opportunity; it’s a labor market failure. Contra Shakespeare,
false attributions enrich the thief often enough that thieves will always exist.
Moreover, the theft often confuses others who want accurate information about
one’s good name, and there is no remedy under current U.S. law to compensate
them for their loss. For that reason, the transfer of attribution from the actual
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creator (whenever she can be identified) should be prohibited in certain
contexts unless it is shown that third parties will not be harmed by it and there
is adequate proof that the transfer was compensated and uncoerced.
In the absence of legal protection for the important interests in
attribution, norms govern credit, and many industries have attempted to
embody the norms into enforceable contracts, professional regulation, and even
certain laws. Yet substantial flaws exist in the way society allocates credit. For
these reasons, there should be a strong presumption against the alienability of
attribution vis a vis the public in most work settings, and an inalienable right to
attribution in human capital assessment.
More than forty years ago, in an article published in the Yale Law
Journal, Charles Reich surveyed the radical changes in wealth and society
spawned by New Deal and Great Society government spending and asked
readers to re-imagine government largess (as he called it) as a new form of
property.155 He suggested that some functions that private property had
hitherto performed in Anglo-American society were increasingly being
performed by government spending programs and that to maintain the liberty
that property law was thought to protect – “the troubled boundary between
individual man and the state” – law should reconceptualize government
benefits as a new property. I have no illusion that my modest proposal either
deserves or will have anything like the impact of his, but my project is not
dissimilar in spirit. In the modern world, in which intellectual property is a
corporate asset and its control is almost completely divorced from individual
creators, the law must re-imagine the role of the individual vis a vis the power
to control information. The four functions that intellectual property ownership
once performed – reward, discipline, branding, and humanizing – have
increasingly been subsumed by attribution. It is time for law to recognize the
extraordinary importance of attribution, and take some modest steps to address
the circumstances where the norms governing attribution break down to ensure
that these socially valuable functions are performed in a desirable manner.
One advantage of explicit recognition of attribution rights would be to
reconcile the views of two opposing camps in the arena of employee-generated
intellectual property. One group advocates strong employer ownership.156
Another camp, of which I am usually counted a member, advocates strong
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employee rights.157 Advocates of employer ownership tend to emphasize the
efficiencies that will be gained by corporate control of intellectual property and
point out that most employees who generate it have been compensated for their
creative services and thus are not victims of unfair treatment when they lose
the right to control the disposition of the information products which they have
created. Employee advocates, by contrast, tend to make equity arguments
emphasizing that employees are expected to be entrepreneurial about their
careers and yet are deprived by strong corporate intellectual property rights
(and aggressive use of contracts restricting post-employment competition)
from being entrepreneurial.
A partial resolution of this debate is the one I propose: to disaggregate
the exclusivity rights associated with intellectual property from the attribution
rights. Disaggregating the exclusivity right from the attribution right, giving
exclusivity to the firm and attribution to the employee, would give both camps
what they most value. Of course, in the case of individually-owned patents and
copyrights, intellectual property would still be a basis for attribution. But with
respect to corporate IP or other workplace knowledge, the firm would get one
hundred percent (minus the wages paid) of the return on the investment in the
creation of the knowledge. Attribution would, however, enhance the ability of
the employee to be entrepreneurial in the labor market.
I have deliberately eschewed a radical proposal of comprehensive
regulation in favor of a modest suggestion that a right to attribution, at least in
some contexts, be presumptively nonwaivable and nontransferable and be
treated as an implied term in every employment contract. A breach of that term
by taking credit where it is not due should be actionable under state contract
law, just as is a breach of an employment agreement requiring just cause for
termination. Moreover, a loss of attribution rights might be understood as one
form of harm (and thus one element of damage) of an otherwise illegal adverse
employment action, such as when an employee is fired or otherwise
discriminated against on the basis of race, religion, disability, or when an
employee is fired in breach of contract.
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One reason for taking a modest and incrementalist approach, besides
those enumerated above, is to accommodate legal change to the complex and
diverse sets of norms that currently govern attribution. Local variation is
important and probably beneficial because it enables flexibility with respect to
the right balance among the six characteristics of an ideal attribution system
and the adaptation of the system to balance norms and law. The goal is to
improve the systems and prevent opportunism while preserving anonymity
where anonymity is beneficial, to allow accountability where it is needed, and
always to facilitate group collaboration that is increasingly a part of the
creative process.
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